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Introduction and Literature Review

Memories of the brutality of World War II in Germany and Poland focus heavily
on the victimhood and suffering ofhuman beings as a result of the war. However, during
this war, many ethnic groups were traumatized by specific incidents or dynamics within
society. Yet, the memory of a singular traumatic incident often has multiple versions,
depending upon the ethnic background of both the perceived victim and perpetrator. A
tragedy can be remembered in many different ways and the roles of perpetrator and
victim are sometimes blurred. Possession of traumatic memory is further compounded
by the fact that during World War II, ethnicity in this region was diverse and not always
clearly defined.
The city once called Danzig, now named Gdansk is one such place, whose
memory of multi-dimensional suffering during World War II is possessed by German as
well as Polish national memory. In this paper, I will analyze Danzig/Gdansk as a place
where remembrance of suffering during, before, and after the war is constructed around
feelings of German and/or Polish victimization as a result of the war. This thesis will go
beyond a re-creation of a space of shared traumatic memory that was the "traumascape"
of Danzig/Gdansk between 1935 and 1945 and invite the reader to consider the multiple
versions of traumatic memories possessed by Germans and Poles who lived in and
around Danzig during the war and suffered as a result. I would argue that the most
significant aspect of the history, accounts, interviews and personal statements of German
and Polish residents of Danzig/Gdansk is a tendency by individuals who witnessed and
perhaps survived the war, to consider only their own ethnicities' suffering at the hands of
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both the Nazis, the Red Army and Polish communist authorities, instead of a shared
concept ofvictimhood. Between 1935 and 1945, whether this traumascape was called
Danzig or Gdansk, Germans and Poles were both perpetrators and victims of suffering,
despite the predominant memory of those living there that could not or would not
conceive of any victims of World War II, other than themselves. Ultimately, what
conceptually separates the city of Danzig from the city of Gdansk, beyond its complete
destruction and re-construction, are the memories of suffering and trauma by those in the
region, often defined by ethnicity, gender, and religion.
This thesis will highlight a number of traumatic memories chronologically in the
history ofthis city. The Versailles Conference will be the beginning ofthe tale of these
two cities in the first chapter, Danzig before 1945. The history of the interwar years
reveals a severe rift between Poland and Weimar Germany over the Free city of Danzig.
German memory would remember the city's nazification, the invasion by Germany and
even the relative safety during the war as traumatic through a general feeling that Nazism
had been forced upon German Danzigers, resulting in their own versions of victimhood.
On the other hand Polish memory of the inter-war period of Danzig would move from
memories of economic prosperity following the polonization of the Polish Corridor, to
notions of victimization at the hands of the Nazis, which escalated considerably during
and after the German invasion of Danzig in 1939, eventually resulting in population
transfer. German memories of Danzig in the early months of 1945, in the chapter The
Refugee City, reveal the city as a refugee outpost and evacuation point in the grip of a

pre-traumatic terror syndrome, whose German victims could not understand their own
suffering, embodied in the fear of the Red Army and Soviet acts of reprisal in the east, as
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being caused directly by their own participation in the Nazi regime. This dynamic
continues in The Destroyed City, when German suffering was greatly expanded by
violence, robbery and rape at the hands of the Red Army. It is no surprise that Polish
memory of the years prior to and during the war would focus on the increasing German
repression of Poles in Danzig, through forced labor, germanization and population
transfer. However, Polish memory of the rebuilding and reclaiming efforts discussed in

The Reclaiming of Gdansk, after the city's capitulation to the Soviets, found justification
in their role as perpetrators of traumatic incidents, through memories of victimization at
the hands of the German majority of the city prior to 1945. German memory of
victimhood in the post-war period would now reflect an experience of suffering, similar
to what the Nazis had perpetrated against the Poles prior to the fall of Danzig.
This study will not focus extensively on Jewish memory of Danzig during World
War II because the history of Jewish suffering in Danzig mainly ends prior to the German
invasion in September of 1939. Stutthof concentration camp, outside of the city was not
a major Jewish extermination center until the end of the war. Recent research has even
disproved the widely held belief that Stutthofhad supposedly delivered Jewish corpses
from the camp to the Danzig Medical Institute where they were processed into soap. 1
Without detracting from the victimization of those Danzig Jews who did remain in the
city after 1939 and suffered during the war, Danzig's small Jewish community did not
endure the hardships most other German and certainly Polish Jews in the east did. To
call any group of Jews or other Holocaust victims historically lucky would be very
difficult to morally substantiate. However, as this analysis will show most Jewish

Joachim Neander, "Th.e Danzig Soap Case: Facts and Legends", German Studies Review Vol.XXIX,
Num. 1, February 2006, 63-68.
1
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Danzigers took the option to escape the city before the war with the help of the British
and without being hindered by extra Nazi brutality, beyond having to sell their
possessions. The Jewish communities ofBerlin, Munich, Warsaw, and Prague were by
and large not given such an option. The importance of the memory of the repression and
extermination of Jews in the city in this analysis is in its relation to memories of German
Danzigers who themselves retained a traumatic memory of guilt for not aiding Danzig's
Jews in their time of need.

Just as the city itself was once shared by Germans and Poles, the historical
interpretations ofWorld War II's impact on the citizens of Danzig/ Gdansk represent a
multitude of contradictory viewpoints. While a great deal of material exists on the Free
City of Danzig as well as the political upheaval in modem communist Gdansk, very little
has been written specifically about the political, military, or social history ofDanzig or
Gdansk during the World War II era. Overall the historiography ofDanzig, reflects the
wider values of West-German, East-German, and Polish post-war society on the topic of
self-victimization
While scholarship written prior to World War II on the history of the city tended
to focus on the Free City of Danzig's economic history and current political development,
it would not be until after the war, that notions ofvictimhood based on ethnicity became
germane. In the post-war era ofthe late 1940s and early 1950s in West Germany,
scholarship on Danzig found its place within the popular public memory of the war that
generally emphasized German victimhood. This paradigm is reflected within the
memoirs and accounts in Theodor Schieder's and Hans Rothfels's highly controversial
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Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe, published by
the Ministry of Expellees between 1953 though 1964, which included Danzig in its
examination. These collections of the accounts of expellees from all over Europe and
parts of the U.S.S.R, provide testimonies of people who lived or were staying in Danzig
during 1945, describing the emotions that those individuals felt. Schieder, himself a
former Nazi supporter, has had his work questioned for inaccuracy, virulently anticommunist right wing partisanship, and reactionary nationalism. Schieder stated that the
documents were written to" ... make the world aware of things that until now have been
for the most part hushed up." He believed that the international community had wanted to
silence German suffering, in favor of a forced sense of collective guilt which stressed
German perpetration of war crimes. 2 Cataloging of German victimhood continued into
the 1960s when the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims in Bonn
released an extensive pamphlet in 1964 which calculated and organized German loses in
the east, including Danzig, with precision. The trend of primary sources on Danzig and
other former German spaces of memory in the east focused exclusively on German losses
into the early 1960s.
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, authorities in both Poland and EastGermany were very critical of such notions of German victimhood, as was reflected by
historical scholarship and analysis on Gdansk from the communist east during this time.
While in West Germany, German refugees from Danzig and elsewhere were called

Vertriebene or "Expellees," in East Germany they were dubbed Aussielder or "Re-
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Robert G. Moeller, War Stories, (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2001), 57-63.
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settlers" in subscribing to communist vernacular, which downplayed Soviet guilt? In
communist Poland, the word "Danzig" itself was illegal and discussion which reflected
upon the traumas that occurred in the city at the hands ofboth the Soviet Union and
Poland at the end ofwar was considered taboo. 4 In the early 1960s, the Polish
communists produced a number of tourist pamphlets to celebrate the completion of the
rebuilding of Gdansk. In their brief assessment of the city's history, the word Danzig
was omitted and any description or analysis of the city's German history was
intentionally downplayed. Refusal to allow a more accurate and multi-sided discussion
or analysis of Gdansk would continue until the liberalizations in the communist world in
the 1980s.
By the mid-1960s West-German modes of memory were being reworked to
include admission and acceptance of guilt. Discussion of German suffering was
relegated to the voices of reactionary politics, in favor of discussions which sought to
accept and mend the trauma inflicted upon the victims of the Nazis. Philosophers such as
Theo~or

Adorno, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, as well as Hannah Arendt were

very critical of West German society's and government's overall denial of their recent
past. While historical scholarship specifically on Danzig remained scant during this
period, fiction writer GUnter Grass, one of the most significant voices in the history of the
city, began writing his "Danzig Trilogy," Die Blechtrommel (The Tin Drum, 1962), Katz

und Maus (Cat and Mouse, 1963) and Hundejahre (Dog Years, 1965). Grass's writings

Robert G. Moeller, "Germans as Victims? Thoughts on a Post-War History of World War II's Legacies,"
History and Memory, (Indiana Univ. Press, 2005), 11 .
4 Bozena Shallcross, "The Archaeology ofOcccuptation: Stephan Chwin's Writings on Danzig/Gdansk,"
Framing the Polish Home: Postwar Cultural Constructions of Hearth, Nation, and Self, (Athens, OH: Ohio
State Univ. Press 2002), 117.
3

6

go beyond insight into the diversity, personality, and fears of the city's residents and
serve as an allegory for the conscience of West Germany during the 1960s. Grass's work
seems to have been generally accepted by the academic community as factually driven
from the perspective of an eyewitness ofthe rise and fall of Nazism in the city, though he
himself did not witness the ultimate destruction of Danzig and the birth of Gdansk.
The literature on Danzig/Gdansk during the 1970s and early 1980s also displays a
continuation ofthe acceptance and study of German guilt. The year 1970 marked the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the war and end ofthe Holocaust. That same year
Herbert Levine published his work on the rise of Nazism in the Free City and the
suffering of Jews under the Nazis. A decade later the Jewish Museum in New York,
would show an exhibit on the history of Danzig Jewry. By the late 1980s and 1990s the
debate on how to remember the suffering of the war began to emerge within a dynamic of
shared experience and scholarship emerged which suggested that the war had victimized
Germans, Jews, and Poles in unique ways, and that these sufferings could be juxtaposed.
As the Eastern Bloc began to crumble, scholarship by historians in the east
displayed a more accurate history of the city. The "Liberalization of Scholarship" under
Premier General J aruzelski facilitated this in Poland during the 1980s. 5 Nonetheless,
communist authorities were unwilling to allow a complete liberalization of censorship on
the memory of Gdansk. For example, although Grass had a good relationship with the
government of communist Poland for his stance on the Oder-Neisse line decision, his
most influential work, Blaszany bs;benek (The Tin Drum), was not published there until

Carl Tighe, Gdansk: ~ational Identity in the Polish-German Borderlands, (London, UK: Pluto Press,
1990), xix-xx.
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1983 and its Polish translation continued to name the city "Gdansk," though Grass had
written it as "Danzig."6
In the last twenty-five years, interest in the history of Danzig/Gdansk has grown
tremendously throughout the historical world in conceptualizing modes of remembrance.
In 1990, Carl Tighe produced the most comprehensive English language history ofthe
city. His work, titled Gdansk/Danzig sought to connect the city to the larger arena of
East Prussia and Pomerania, both of which possessed a shared German and Polish
heritage. A more recent epistemological trend in the scholarship on this period has
promoted the idea of"working through," as a method of reading, writing, and thinking
about shared histories of suffering as a result of World War II. This concept has different
definitions depending on the scholar, but ultimately it refers to the process of working
through all the material of controversial topics such as suffering associated with the end
of the war and not simply examining German, Polish or Jewish suffering exclusively.
German post-war scholars such as Robert Moeller have suggested that "Aufarbeitung " or
the concept of working through German history should encompass writers ofboth fiction
and non-fiction in portraying a constructive history which seeks to improve present
memory, by considering all angles of a topic such as traumatic history. 7 Moeller, in his
2001 book War Stories: The Search for A Useable Past in the Federal Republic of
Germany, as well as several subsequent article publications researched the memory of
German suffering in Post War Germany, asserting that it is possible and ethical to write a

Ibid, 277-281.
Robert Moeller, "Sinking Ships, the Lost Heimat and Broken Taboos: Gunter Grass and the Politics of
Memory in Conternpor~ry Germany." Contemporary European History Vol. 12, (NY: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2003), 180.
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military history of the war's end in "which Germans caused immeasurable suffering and
Germans suffer immeasurably."8
With the fall of communism discussion of previously controversial topics such as
the history of Gdansk, were no longer subject to censorship. Polish fiction writer Stefan
Chwin brought his story Hanemann, later translated to English as Death in Danzig, to the
international literary scene in 1995, painting a history of the city from the perspective of
Polish memory. Recent secondary literature from Poland tends to discuss Gdansk within
the entire scope of cities of shared memory at the end of the war. Polish historian
Bemadetta Nitschke's 2004 publication, translated into German as Vertreibung und
Aussiedlung DerDeutschen Bevolkerung aus Polen 1945 bis 1949 is the most recent and
most comprehensive scholarly work which includes Gdansk in its assessment of post-war
history. In terms of specific history on Gdansk, Sylwia Bykowska's 2005 article
"Gdansk-miasto (szybko) odzyskane" ("Gdansk a city (quickly) recovered") in the Polish
journal Biuletyn Instytutu Pamieci Narodowej, divulged a more complex and
encompassing history of the city, in examining the motivations and memories ofthe
Polish re-claiming efforts after the war's end suggests that Polish authorities were also
perpetrators of trauma.
Within the last few years, historical research in English on cities such as Gdansk,
Szczecin, Wroclaw, and other places of shared Polish and German memory has been
pursued extensively. Following his seminal multi-volume work God's Playground: A
History of Poland, Norman Davies published a study in 2002 entitled Microcosm:
Portrait of a Central European City, which focused on the history ofBreslau/Wroclaw as
an example of a place of shared German and Polish memory. One recent trend among
8

Moeller, "Germa~s as Victims? Thoughts ... ," 5.

9

historians such as Elizabeth Clark and literary experts such as Joanna Stimmel has been
to look at the visual evidence of the destruction of Danzig, and the rebuilding of Gdansk,
formulating the idea that the traumatic memory of the Danzig's destruction should be
considered part of a shared catastrophe. Both scholars are interested in material and
architectural history and in examining the city's complex and violent history. Their
studies, based mainly on modem Polish history and literature respectively, are among the
first attempts to examine the history of this city, specifically through modes of trauma
remembrance as shared memories between Germans, Poles, and Jews in Danzig/ Gdansk.
What is lacking from the literature is a serious consideration of the history of
Danzig/Gdansk and the ways shared memories of victimhood were constructed by
Germans and Poles. A study which looks at actual descriptions and memories of
suffering and victimhood in order to attain a true sense of the traumascape in Danzig/
Gdansk between 1935 and 1945. In a place like Danzig or Gdansk, where the very
definitions of perpetrator versus victim or Germans versus Pole are blurred, working
through all versions of traumatic memory is necessary in formulating a complete history
of the end of the city once named Danzig and the rebirth of the city now called Gdansk.

10

Danzig Before 1945

With the passing of World War I, Danzig had experienced a hundred years
without being directly involved in, a witness to, or affected by any sort of significant
trauma, a fact of which few major cities in Eastern France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany, and Poland could boast. Danzig's port was mainly used in support of the
eastern front and the city witnessed no combat, destruction, or significant loss of life.
While Danzig was of minor importance in the Great War's military history, its
importance as an item on the diplomatic agenda of the post-war decision-making process
was key. The decision to establish the Free City of Danzig, separated from Germany by
the Polish Corridor to the Baltic Sea, was not popular with the ethnic German residents
who comprised ninety-five percent of the population of Danzig. The inter-war period in
the Free State was marked by economic and ethnic competition between Poland and
Danzig. Worldwide depression, increased economic competition and fear ofpolinization
in Danzig, all resulted in economic support and relief from Weimar Germany, which led
to the nazification ofDanzig politics. International scrutiny of the Free State grew soft
during the 1930s due to the perception that the region problems had stabilized, resulting
in the complete nazification ofDanzig politics, whose first victims were Danzig's Jewish
community
Though separated geographically from Germany, it is accurate to say that
Danzig's government, politics, and most residents were under the control of the Nazi
party by 1935. The Free State of Danzig still existed as a politically autonomous entity.
Danzig was Hitler's first military target and the first battle of World War II took place in
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the streets and harbors of the city. Just as Germans in Danzig had actively supported the
nazification of Danzig's politics, they were equally complicit in the invasion as the
German population knew preemptively that Hitler was going to invade their city.
Danzigers also did not come to the aid of the Polish military targets in the city. After
takeover, nazification of the city's population, as well as the complete transformation of
Gdynia, Danzig's former competitor to the north, became the new priority for the Nazis.
Danzig by and large was not affected by the ravages of World War II until 1945,
allowing the German authorities to pursue a racially homogenous Gau of Danzig-West
Prussia.
Despite these historical realities, memories ofboth Germans and Poles, born and
raised in Danzig during the inter-war period and recorded as adults after the war, focus on
establishing their innocence in the nazification and invasion of the Free City and their
own victimization at the hands of the Nazi authorities. Accounts and interviews of
individuals who lived in the Free City during the inter-war period describe it as a place
where Germans and Poles lived in harmony, despite political tensions between Weimar
Germany, Poland and Danzig. Positive memories of this period change into memories of
personal victimization at the hands of the Nazis during the outbreak of World War II in
Danzig. Both Germans and Poles remembered the invasion of the city as something that
was forced upon Danzig, where working class people of both ethnicities suffered. It is
not surprising that memory of those Poles who remained in the city focuses on their own
suffering through forced germanization and population transfer. What is surprising is
that Germans living in Danzig, which by all accounts must have been one of the safest
and least war-tom places in the Third Reich, retained a traumatic memory of the war
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years prior to 1945. Even though they enjoyed the status of the dominant ethnic group in
a secluded military position, German memory from this time had a predictive quality
which foresaw that Danzig Germans would one day bear the brunt of the suffering at the
war's end, following the unavoidable defeat of Hitler.
The Allied powers came to the Versailles table in 1919 fully convinced that a
strong and independent Poland was the only way to check future German aggression.
Granting Poland access to the sea was seen as crucial to giving the country the ability to
fill its newly conceived role and donating Danzig to Poland seemed the most obvious
solution. Wilson had proposed this idea within the Fourteen Points and was supported by
Clemenceau, only the British delegation was hesitant to support so drastic and permanent
a solution in such a multi-ethnic region. In 1918 the British Foreign Office had already
declared that "for the sake of Poland's own future, we must firmly oppose exaggerated
Polish claims."9 British skepticism for simply giving Danzig to Poland, led to the
alternative plan by James W. Headlam-Morley to create a completely autonomous Free
City protected by the League ofNations. 10 Poland was given a corridor to the sea, cutting
Danzig off from Germany, which for the Poles was at least a halfvictory and gave them
an opportunity to pursue Danzig in the future. Most important for Poland was the
continuation of its export up the Vistula, without toll or hindrance, as well as to stay
connected to the Baltic shipping economy. With the creation of a corridor, the Poles

Christopher M. Kimmlich, The Free City: Danzig and the German Foreign Policy, (New Haven, CT: Yale
Univ. Press, 1968), 3-4:
10 Ibid, 10.
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realized that export did not necessarily need to go through Danzig anymore and that
"Danzig needed Poland, more than Poland needed Danzig."

11

When the Allied powers ratified Section XI of the Treaty of Versailles on 10
January 1919, the city became known as Freie Stadt Danzig to Germans and Wolne
Miasto Gdansk to Poles. However, the latter of these two ethnic communities was

vociferously outraged at the results of Versailles. In March of that year 70,000 to
100,000 Danzigers rallied to protest the separation of their city geographically from
Germany proper. 12 A rally of that size, approximately a quarter of the city's population,
reveals a general sentiment of Danzigers' dislike of the results of international
peacemaking, while simultaneously showing affinity and continued support for Germany,
the same country which had aggressively instigated, exacerbated, and pursued the last
war, causing the death ofhundreds ofthousands of Germans across Europe. Though few
in Danzig had any idea of what it was like to have a city shelled or burnt, to have the
young male populations of entire neighborhoods and hamlets listed as casualties of war,
or to have women raped by marauding soldiers and fewer still had any recollection of the
last time any sort of storm of violence had rained down on Danzig.
The law of Danzig was to be enforced by the League of Nations, independent of
the Weimar Republic and Poland, but this was hardly the case. Protection of Danzig and
its German population was supremely important to Weimar foreign policy and managed
to influence politics in the Free City. For instance, career bureaucrats from the Weimar
government dominated the civil service of Danzig throughout the interwar period. Also,

Elizabeth Clarke, "Reshaping the Free City: Cleansed Memory in Danzig/Gdansk, 1939-1952," Ethnic
Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, (Columbia University Press, NY 2003), 3.
12 John B. Mason, The Danzig Dilemma: A Study in Peacemaking by Compromise, (Stanford, CA:
Stanford Univ. Press, 1946), 6.
11
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during times of economic hardship in Danzig, especially during the world-wide
depression of the 1930s, Germany consistently stepped in to provide economic relief to
Danzig, so that nothing could diminish the precious sense of Deutschum or perceived
cultural, linguistic, and national connectedness to Germany, which the city was trying to
retain. Throughout the 1920s, Danzig remained economically dependent upon foreign
aid, mainly from Germany. Political and economic problems in Germany in the wake of
Versailles played out in a similar, though much smaller scale in Danzig. 13
The Free City of Danzig was supposed to be a model of inter-ethnic co-operation
'

and co-habitation with Poland where Germans and Poles were to live in economic and
political harmony, though this was hardly the case. As a result of the Russo-Polish War
in 1920, the city's trade with Poland was non-existent, causing a major depression there.
Almost immediately after the end of the war, Poles began buying up property in Danzig
on a large scale as property prices had dropped considerably. German anti-Polish
agitation was ever present and increasing during the Free City period, often manifesting
itself in slowing down and sabotaging the Polish exports, going through the city.
Germans in Danzig felt particularly threatened by the Polish Post Office which opened in
1920, Polish control of the railroad, and the Polish garrison on the Westerplatte, as they
were all constant reminders ofPoland's omnipresence in the city. By 1930, the Polish
population of Danzig grew to about 50,000, eighty percent of whom were members of
'·~

community associations, cultural institutions, or subscribed to newspapers for Poles.
Relations between Warsaw and Danzig deteriorated, particularly in 1923 when Lithuania

13
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seized the city ofMemel. Rumors that Poland would do the same to Danzig reached
Berlin and troops were mobilized on both sides of the border. 14
Economic competition between Danzig and Poland led to increased polonization
of the Polish Corridor, particularly through the economic development ofGdynia. After
a decade of struggling to share the port of Danzig with German dominated interests in the
city, the Polish government encouraged the expansion ofthe port ofGdynia, ten miles to
the north. 15 The Polish Corridor by this time had been heavily polonized and many
Germans had already been squeezed out ofboth Gdynia and the Corridor. 16 What was
once a tiny fishing village in 1920 was transformed into a prosperous port, which by 1930
exceeded Danzig by twice the tonnage ofboth imports and exports. With the
development of the port of Gdynia, Poland no longer had to rely on the hostile Danzigers
to export its goods. The Poles used Gdynia to harass and rival Danzig, to the point where
the League High Commission had to step in and establish trade quotas to ameliorate the
situation. 17 By 1933, Gdynia had become Europe's ninth largest port and any trade up
the Vistula to Danzig was done merely to fulfill international quotas. 18
The political and economic realities of the inter-war period in the Free State of
Danzig would suggest that a severe rift existed between the German majority and Polish
minority in Danzig. However, the memories of residents who were children during this
period suggest that Germans and Poles lived in harmony with one another. Lajica
Lewandowska, a Pole born in Danzig in 1929, stated that although her family was
ethnically Polish, they usually spoke German and that she didn't even start to speak
Tighe, 104-105.
Mason, 105-109.
16 Tighe, 92.
17 Mason, 109-125
18 Tighe, 104-105.
14

15

16

Polish until after the war. Growing up she went to a school where both Germans and
Polish teachers taught a class of German and Polish students in German. Lewandowska
stated that "Before the war everyone lived peacefully." 19 Likewise, the account of Gisela
Lehmann, an ethnic German born in 1933, recalled that growing up during this period in
Danzig was a positive experience, "without many troubles." 20 Both the memories of
Lehmann; a German and Lewandowska; a germanized Pole, seem to emphasize that
ethnic tensions in Danzig did not exist, despite growing political strife between Germany
and Poland, with the Free City of Danzig in the cross-fire. These positive memories of
the interwar period would later tum into notions of victimization at the hands ofNazis
during the beginning and the end of the war in Danzig.
Throughout the 1930s Danzig was dependent on German trade, diplomacy, and
political direction more than ever. Economically, Danzig was doing more business than
it had in two decades, despite diminished trade with Poland, because the German
government guaranteed a certain amount of business to go through the city' s port as a
supplement. 21 The worldwide depression in the 1930s once again required Germany to
aid Danzig economically, which simultaneously allowed Versailles revisionism to
flourish. This decade witnessed a never ending attempt by both the governments of the
Weimar Republic and Danzig to revise the ruling on its Free State status in the Versailles
settlement. Several times the League ofNations rejected referendums from the people of
Danzig to return to Germany proper. Economic aid from Germany carried with it the
disease of the growing right-wing political activism in the Weimar republic. The world

"Lajica Lewandowska interview," conducted by author, 3114/06.
Gisela Lehmann, "The Developments leading up to our forced resettlement from our original homeland,"
(Koln, 1950), 1. .
21 Mason, 26-101.
19

20
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began to see Weimar revisionism and the rise ofNational Socialism as part of the same
problem, causing any questions concerning the return to Germany of Danzig or the
Corridor to be suspended. 22
While the history of National Socialism's growth in the Free City of Danzig is not
unusual to any German city at this time, most Germans in Danzig seemed to embrace
Nazism enthusiastically. Mirroring the Weimar republic, The Free City's political arena
was awash with different political parties and affiliations. The early Volkish parties
found their place in Danzig politics, along with the communists, centrist Catholic, and
polish parties. The main challenge for right wing politics in the 1920s was internal
bickering and power struggles, mirroring those in Munich at the time. 23 Albert Hohnfeldt
is generally credited for initially bringing Nazism to Danzig. A native of Danzig,
Hohnfeldt left his home to participate in the "Beer Hall Putsch" of 1923 in Munich and
returned two years later to form a Danzig wing of the SA. It was not until 1930, that
Herman Goring installed Albert Forster to guide National Socialism in the Free City,
naming him Gauleiter of the Danzig Nazi party. Known for his powerful oratorical skills,
Forster, who despite not a being a native Danziger but a Bavarian, was successful
because he implemented elements ofNational Socialism from Germany, which had been
the base of much ofNazi political success up to this point in the Free City, while
avoiding international attention to the growing city's right-wing. Forster brought with
him youth movements, the Danziger Vorposten propaganda newspaper and support from
the rural districts within the Free State. Forster also encouraged street warfare against
communists, Jews and Poles. It could be said that Forster's most important tactic in
Kimmlich, 160-166.
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gaining support in Danzig, was that he made the Danzig Germans believe that Hitler
cared about the city and made them believe him. On the eve of the 1930 election he
united the squabbling right wing political groups in Danzig and led the Nazis to gain
16.1% ofthe vote in the Danzig Senate (18.3% in the Weimar election ofthat year). 24
The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, which outlined peaceful
relations between these two nations was the key event in dictating the future ofNazi
dominated politics in the Free City of Danzig. Hermann Rauschning, who the Danzig
Nazi party had elected to be its chairman and to serve as the city's Senate president,
signed an agreement with Polish Premier J6zefPilsudski to guarantee that Polish
language, culture, and education in the city would be preserved, and that the rights of
both Catholic and Jewish citizens of Poland be maintained. In return the Poles agreed to
a more equitable split of the commerce coming up the Vistula River. The League of
Nations witnessed this seeming act of good will as a sign that this region and its ethnic
and national questions had been resolved. Following the Non-Aggression pact the
League unofficially phased itself out of any current or future arbitrations processes
between Poland and Germany over Danzig. 25 This allowed the Nazis in the city to use
increased street violence against their opposition in the 1935 election, in which the Nazi
party took the majority of the Senate. Immediately, laws banning opposition parties and
repression of the rights ofPoles and Jews, public segregation, and legal restrictions
emerged. 26 By the later part of the 1930s, Danzig politics was firmly under the thumb of
Hitler. The League made no official comment or response to this violence and results of
the election and it seemed as ifboth the League and the Polish government washed their
Ibid, 31-35
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hands of the Danzig issue. At this point the Free City of Danzig was free only in name
and the politics and authority of Berlin would now determine its future course of the city.
Now that Danzig politics and law were determined by Hitler, Nazi authorities in
the city soon began initiating a policy of Gleichschaltung, the process ofnazification,
whose first target was Danzig's Jewish population. Since Kristallnacht in Danzig on 12
November 1938, a few days after it had transpired in Weimar Germany, Nazi authorities
in the city made it their agenda to force most of the 6,000 Jews in Danzig (2% of the
city's overall population) to leave prior to the invasion. Following the enactment of the
Nuremberg Laws in Danzig later that month, Danzig's Jews faced constant harassment
and laws which sub-humanized them, causing Jewish emigration from the city to begin.
The first Jews to leave were those with Polish citizenship, who had the ability to simply
move a few miles away from Danzig to the Polish Corridor. On 17 December 1939,
2,000 gathered at Danzig's Great Synagogue and were convinced by Rabbi Hermann
Segall to flee the city. He had been contacted by Nazi officials and told that if the Jews
of the city did not leave immediately they would be subject to worse treatment. Segal
convinced his congregation that with guaranteed help from the British, Danzig's Jews
would be transported to Palestine. Though they would have to pay for their own transfer
from the city, Forster himself had promised the Rabbi that they would not be molested if
they left Danzig. 27-. On 3 March 1939 the first transport of five-hundred Danzig Jews left
for Palestine, without any problems. When Danzig was invaded in September only
seventeen-hundred registered Jews were left in the city, most of whom were elderly and
eventually transferred to Theresianstadt concentration camp. 28 While Stutthof
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concentration camp, which had existed several miles east of Danzig since 1939 would
have been the likely destination for the handful of Jews who remained, this camp mostly
served to imprison and liquidate Poles from the region, as well as interned Soviet and
British POWs. In fact Nazi authorities did not designate Stutthof as a major internment
or extermination center for Jews until 1944. 29
One eyewitness to the repression of Jews in Danzig in the 1930s is GUnter Grass,
who simultaneously blames Danzigers, especially Christian clergymen, for allowing the
repression of the city's Jews, while retaining his own sense of victimization for being
complicit in the Holocaust. In his 1980 essay entitled "What Shall We Tell Our
Children," Grass recalls, growing up in the Danzig suburb of Langfuhr, the day when the
SA burnt down the synagogue which was on the same street as the Church of The Sacred
Heart, where he served as an alter boy when he was not participating as a loyal Hitler
Youth. Grass remembered his bishops and priests standing by and remaining silent on
the repression of their fellow Danzigers and fellow human beings. They did not even
utter a word of disgust for the anti-Semitic violence, or a prayer for the victims. He
writes, "Individual Christians and Christian groups share the utmost bravery in resisting
Nazism, but the cowardice of the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany made the
churches inactive accomplices."30 As a Danziger he works through the trauma of how he
and his family, neighbors, friends, and fellow Christians could stand by and allow such a
thing to happen. Grass's accusations firmly place the blame on both the lay population,
and on the Danzig clergy in there compliance with Nazism.
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Yet, Gunter Grass retained a sense of suffering for the guilt of being a perpetrator
in the Holocaust. He reported that later in life he suffered from nightmares because of
this guilt. He writes, "I could not swear that had I been six or seven years older, I would
not have participated in the great crime. My doubts were such that I was plagued (more
and more often as time passed) by nightmares in which I felt myself to be guilty."31
Most Gern1an and Polish witnesses to these events in Danzig, including Lewandowska
and Lehmann, who are about Grass age's, stated that they were unaware of the crimes
being committed against Jews until after the war. Their memory of the war focuses
exclusively on their own suffering at the hands of the Nazis. Grass as an eyewitness
rejects their innocence, emphatically stating that he and almost all other Danzigers young
and old were privy to and often served as agents in the perpetration of Jewish victimhood.
Grass's traumatic memories differ from standard German and Polish memory of the
nazification of Danzig in that his acknowledges being a perpetrator, instead of a victim of
the Nazis

Most German Danzigers surely sensed that Hitler would invade the city and return
it to the Third Reich. On 31 August 1945, he notified the German foreign office in
Danzig that military takeover of the city would begin the next day? 2 Reportedly, anyone
who ventured out into the street of Danzig early in the morning of 1 September would
have seen German news reel crews setting up and waiting for something to film.
Whether Polish citizens, civil service, or military in Danzig were privy to this advanced
knowledge is not known; however, the Germans who had been made aware of the
31 Ibid.
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impeding invasion did nothing to stop the German military from striking them. The

Schlesweg-Holstein fired on Polish warehouses on the docks, while German troops
occupied the Polish operated railway station and customs office. The Poles locked inside
the Post Office held out, until a battalion of SS-Heimwehr burnt out the resistance with
flame throwers, executing all who surrendered. It took five days for the German army to
subdue the Polish garrison on the Westerplatte. As Hitler and Forster formally
announced the return of Danzig to Germany, Wehrmacht troops swept into the city, on
route to reclaiming the rest of the Corridor and later Poland. Civilian casualty rates as a
direct result of the invasion were minimal and those who died in the fighting were mainly
Polish dock workers and civil servants. 33
Both German and Polish memory ofthe events of 1 September 1945 focus
strongly on trauma through victimization as working class Danzigers who stood against
Nazi authorities in their annexation of the city. The memories of both a German and
germanized Pole in Danzig who witnessed these events seem to emphasize that this
invasion was something which Danzigers did not support and which caused them and
their families a great deal of personal trauma. Gisela Lehmann recalled being awakened
that day by shots and then witnessed her father's arrest by the Gestapo. He had refused to
join the party and remained a member of a labor union until his arrest, which resulted in
the loss of his rights as a citizen, his job at the railways, and his immediate drafting into
the army.34 Lajica Lewandowska, who was eleven years old in 1939, experienced a
similar set of traumatic memories that day. Her father, also a railroad worker was
arrested on 1 September, for complaining about the German invasion of Danzig. He had
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fought for Germany during World War I and even had proof of his veteran's status with
him as he was taken to prison. Nevertheless, he was detained for three weeks, causing
him also to be fired from his job? 5
While the Lehmann and Lewandowska families possess traumatic memories of
the invasion of Danzig, which they opposed and suffered for as a consequence, most
citizens remained passive during Hitler's invasion. No records or reports indicate that the
people of the so called Free city offered any resistance to the soldiers storming the
railroad, customs offices and government buildings, nor aiding the Polish resistance in
the post office and Westerplatte garrison. In fact, Danzigers by and large seemed to
welcome the invasion, considering that Hitler was greeted by thousands as a savior when
he made his first official visited on 20 September. 36 Yet, the memories of Gisela
Lehmann and Lajica Lewandowska are an attempt in trying to distance themselves and
their families from those Danzigers who welcomed the Nazis. Both accounts also
describe 1 September 1939 as a day when both German and Polish working class people
suffered. Yet the history of the city's invasion seems to indicate that working class
people supported Danzig's return to Gern1any. The traumatic memories of both women's
fathers have several commonalities. The city's railroad industry had been mainly
manned and run by Poles, who as blue collar laborers were no doubt subject to leftist
politics, making both men doubly suspect in the eyes of the German authorities, no matter
what their ethnicity was. Both women's accounts stated their families didn't belong to
any political parties or ethnic organizations and were completely apolitical, yet both had
fathers who were arrested on this day for political reasons, causing their children to retain
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a traumatic memory ofthe 1 September 1945. Perhaps the most significant commonality
between the memories of Lehmann and Lewandowska is what they fail to remember or
omitted when they were recorded as adults with post-war hindsight. Neither Lehmann's
account, recorded as an expellee in Cologne in 1950, nor Lewandowska's interview in
March of 2006, display any attempt to consider how their respective families may have
been complacent towards, in denial of, or even played an indirect role in the nazification
of Danzig.
As the Jews of Danzig had for the most part been eliminated as a significant
presence prior to 1939, nazification efforts in Danzig focused much more on eliminating
the Polish presence from the region. Danzig law had already succeeded in prohibiting
Poles from owning motorcycles, cars, radios, telephones, and record players. Now,
nazification was to be carried out throughout the newly formed Gau ofDanzig-West
Prussia to eliminate all evidence of Polish existence and prosperity. Beyond renaming
Polish streets and towns, stripping Poles of their rights and eliminating the speaking or
teaching of Polish, the German authority's prerogative of Gleichschaltung was the
complete elimination of the Polish national element in all its forms and manifestations in
the Gau ofDanzig-West Prussia. 37
The Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung faced the challenge of how to deal with
Danzig's inherently multi-ethnic character. In Danzig the lines between who was
German and who was Polish were not always clear, as many people had Germans
surnames, but spoke Polish, or Polish names but spoke German. It terms of fulfilling
their goals of an ethnically homogenous Gau of Danzig-West Prussia, the Nazi
authorities pursued a policy of categorization along ethnic lines. They had little difficulty
37
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in deciding the fate ofPolish citizens and any Pole who had moved to Danzig-West
Prussia after 1918 was transferred. This was true in other eastern Gaus and by the end of
October of 1939, 30,000 to 40,000 Poles were expelled from Danzig, Pomerania, and the
areas of the former Polish Corridor combined. 38 Danzig was an ethnically peculiar place
because its population included a small percentage ofKashubians, Kosnavians, and
Masurians, Slavic groups native to the Baltic region that had been germanized over the
centuries and had been interacting with, marrying, and living in close proximity to ethnic
Germans and Poles. These mixed ethnicities embodied the less than clear-cut problem
for the new hyper-germanization policy of the Nazi authorities. In their never ending
pursuit of categorizing existence, the Nazis found ways to build a racial hierarchy, even
in a place like Danzig. Generally these mixed ethnic groups were considered
"Nichtdeutsche." Although this distinction placed them at the bottom of the racial

pyramid, they were German enough not to be transferred, a situation in which they would
again find themselves in the spring and summer of 1945. 39
Gauleiter Albert Forster favored retaining some Poles for labor forcing them to in
essence become German on paper. His policy of nazification by 1941 employed the
process of screening the Gau's population according to Reich standards, followed by
deportation of excess Polish and Jewish individuals, and the resettlement of Poles to the
Wartheland, the General Government and the Baltic regions. 40 Those Poles who were
not deported were forced to apply for the German Volksliste, a national register of
Germans in the region. Those who refused were threatened with imprisonment or
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deportation. 41 Lajica Lewandowska recalled that everyone she knew was declaring
themselves German after September 1939. She stated that the Nazis categorized those on
the Volksliste into a four class system ofvarying levels of"germaness." The fourth or
bottom class was a grant of German citizenship given to Poles, which gave the
government the option of revoking this privilege anytime without a reason, which would
result in deportation. Lewandowska stated that she, her family, and most Poles were at
the bottom of this list. Memories of the Volksliste went beyond mere feelings of
alienation, also invoking memories of extreme violence against the Polish presence in
Danzig. She noted that immediately following the invasion all Polish priests who had not
fled the city were rounded up and shot instead ofbeing placed on the Volksliste. As a
deeply religious Polish Roman Catholic this traumatic memory in particular haunted
Lewandowska. The memory of these dead clergymen, now immortalized by a statue in
Gdansk, remains with her to this day. 42
One area in the Gau which the Nazis focused particular attention towards the
nazification ofwas the renamed and reclaimed city ofGotenhafen. This city known to
Poles prior to the invasion as Gdynia was completely built, modernized and made
successful by the Polish interwar government, as its first true Baltic port. To the Nazi
authorities it was a place of ridicule, distaste and un-cleanliness that needed to be
reclaimed into the German cultural space. Dr. Richard Csaki of the Deutsches AuslandsInstitut had visited Gdynia in the spring of 1939, prior to the invasion, in an undercover
investigation of whether the city might one day be fit for German habitation. He found
Gdynia, as the Poles had constructed it, to be a "Gigantomaniac" place of American41
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influenced institutional architecture. Margarete Blasche, a teacher from Schneidemuhl,
took a tour of Gotenhafen in 1940 and compared the boring Polish architecture with the
beauty ofDanzig's architecture and wrote that it was the product of"Capitalist spirit and
soulless internationalism." In 1941 a Nazi women's periodical called NS-Frauenwarte
published an article by Renate von Steda, who reported how disgusting and vile
confiscated Polish houses in the city were and that "gas had to be used to rid them of
vermin before German people could be accommodated there." 43
Gdynia had been reclaimed by Germans as Gotenhafen in accordance with
Hitler's general policy of Lebensraum, but still had remained a gross codeword for Polish
inferiority, un-cleanliness, and capitalist endeavors. Where the German culture of Danzig
appeared to be orderly, rational, and tidy, Polish culture in Gdynia was industrial,
disconnected, random, and disorderly. 44 Interestingly, all these accounts refer to the city
as Gdingen, the German translation ofGdynia and not the city's new name: Gotenhafen.
This suggests that the writers of these statements felt that the city was still awash in the
impurity of polonization, manifested in the physical state and appearance of Gotenhafen
and that in order to reclaim the cultural space of this city, much more action would be
required by Germans than mere name changes. The main result of this dynamic in
Gotenhafen, as well as other places in the Danzig region was the dislocation or transfer of
entire town populations in the areas of the Gau, which had formally been part of the
Polish Corridor, to fulfill the reclaiming of space. 45
Germanization through population transfer was not particular to Gdynia or the
former Polish Corridor, and Polish memory of the interwar years in the city of Danzig
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reflects this final stage of Polish victimization at the hands ofthe Nazis. Lewandowska's
memory of her family's existence under the Nazis during World War II indicates that
despite years of accepted germanization prior to 1939 and forced germanization
immediately afterwards, Poles who remained in the city continued to suffer heavily.
Although her father was eventually released from prison and able to find work at a
shipyard outside the city, her brothers, ages sixteen and twenty-one, were sent to work in
Germany. Her uncle, who had been forced to hide outside of Danzig as he had been a
railroad official, was discovered and sent to a labor camp, causing his wife to commit
suicide in 1943.46 Polish memory ofthe war indicates that suffering inflicted by the
Nazis upon Poles who remained in Danzig was continuously evolving and resulted in the
complete eradication of a Polish presence in the region through population transfer.
Although Danzig was a relative safe haven throughout most of the war, German
memory of life in the city between 1939 and late 1944 expresses a sense of a pretraumatic stress syndrome within the city's seclusion and safety. Although Hitler had
used it as a staging point in 1939 to take Poland and sweep up the Baltic coast as well as
during Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Danzig was fairly untouched by the ravages of
World War II. The city's port served as an assembly base for submarines, which were
tested in the Bay ofDanzig. In July 1942, the British RAF bombed the base with
minimal damage to either the base or Danzig's production output. 47 Beyond these
isolated events, such as the occasional bomb raid, and the death of Danzig men who had
died in combat, the city's Germans experienced little war-related tragedy. Nevertheless,
Gisela Lehmann wrote that this sense of calm was subordinated to the trauma of her fear
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ofthe impending doom in store for Danzig: "Until 1944 we were almost totally
untouched by the bombing attacks on our old historic city. Only at the beginning of 1945
were we to feel the full impact of the inhuman unavoidable tortures of the war."
Lehmann also noted that after her grandmother died in 1943, her mother and the priest
consoling her, "Stayed at our home on long evenings while both him and my mother
discussed the future and terrible end which was to befall us." 48 Within these sentiments
is a sense that the war in the east, like the takeover of Danzig itself, was propagated
solely by Hitler and the Nazis and a prediction that the Germans in Danzig were going to
suffer as a result ofboth. Lehmann's memories of the war years in Danzig do not
consider that Germans in the city had allowed the Nazis to inflict suffering upon their
Polish neighbors. Instead, the trauma of fear that the outcome of the war would surely
end badly for the innocent Germans of Danzig prevails in her memories.
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The Refugee City

With the arrival of the winter of 1944 and the advance of the Red Army through
East Prussia, Danzig and its then 404,000 citizens had already begun to witness an influx
of eastern Germans fleeing the approaching eastern front. 49 Even before January 1945
refugees, predominantly from the south ofthe Gau of Danzig-West Prussia, East Prussia
and the Baltic region began swarming into the city to escape the Soviet invasion. By
January, Danzig was the main rally point for refugees, fleeing west by land and sea. It
was a relatively safe position in the crumbling east through the winter and early spring of
1945, despite the proximity of Danzig to the epicenter of the fighting and had suffered
inconsistently from bomb raids until that point. Danzig was a place that refugees from
the east felt they could live in safely or find transportation to interior regions of the
Reich. Those refugees from other eastern German territories encountered great perils to
flee to Danzig. Ultimately, tales of suffering by eastern German refugees, especially
incidents of rape caused the refugees and citizens ofDanzig to take extremely dangerous
measures in order to escape the city. Like rape, rumors of the perils of evacuation by sea
proved to be true for many unlucky refugees. On the other hand, most native Danzigers
remained in the city and by and large made no attempt to leave until almost March, when
the city's fall was all but imminent. This was the result of continued belief in Hitler and
the German armies' ability to drive back the Russians. Loss of faith in the war effort and
in the Nazi superstructure also caused rampant crime, profiteering, and an attempt by
Germans to distance themselves from their guilt ridden past.
49
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Statistically speaking, Danzig, Gotenhafen, and the small port ofHela on the
northeastern tip of the Hela peninsula, were the evacuation points to the west by both
land and sea for 900,000 refugees in January alone. By May, long after the city had
fallen, 300,000 additional refugees, wounded soldiers and civilians would leave the port.
Whether it was known as Danzig or Gdansk, the ports ofthis region evacuated 1,285,000
approximately, more than any other single city in East or West Prussia, or Pomerania. 5°
These figures alone demonstrate the importance of Danzig as a rallying point for
refugees. Furthermore, these statistics suggest that it may have been common knowledge
among German refugees that Danzig was a safe haven, worth enduring the hardships of
the Baltic winter and Russian onslaught in an attempt to flee there in January and
February 1945. It seems that Danzig had reached mythic status for refugees as a safe
haven amidst the crumbling eastern front.
This false sense of safety which seemed to exist in Danzig during this time
among both residents and refugees was promoted by a number of factors. Foremost, was
the faith in Hitler and the Nazi regime among Germans in the east. Gauleiter Albert
Forster had ordered the city to begin to reinforce its defenses in November of 1944,
confidently believing that if worse came to worst he would be able to defend the capital
of his Gau until Hitler released his "secret weapon" which would drive the Red Army
back. 5 1 Hans von Lehndorff, a doctor and surgeon from Allenstein, East Prussia, just east
ofDanzig appeared also to have been convinced by the idea of Hitler's secret weapon.
Lehndorffmay have also been specifically influenced by the sadistically loyal Gauleiter
of East Prussia, Erich Kohl, who preached of a "wonder-weapon" that would save the
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Germans of the east. 52 Lehndorffwrote, "The Fuhrer has planned everything up to now
and must have some definite reason for letting the Russians push so deep into our
country. " 53
Even though Hitler ordered Forster to hold Danzig to the last man, it would be too
reductionist to contend that it was merely faith in Hitler and his ability to contrive a
miracle weapon to repel the Soviets. Likewise, it is difficult to determine how
widespread among the lay Danzig population the reportedly common belief was which
asserted that even if Germany lost the war, Danzig would revert immediately to Free
State status under international protection. 54 Eyewitnesses to the events transpiring in the
city in the winter of 1945 attributed fear of SS retributions for cowardice and noncompliance in the defense of the east rather than faith in Hitler or post-war international
intervention by the Allies, as being far more likely causes of this continued sense of
loyalty towards the Third Reich by the residents of and refugees in Danzig. Lajica
Lewandowska confirmed this beliefwhen she stated that bodies of Germans hanging
from trees and lampposts were a common sight as early as January of 1945. This was a
constant and morbid visual reminder of the fate that awaited Germans who did not remain
loyal to Hitler. 55
For Germans outside of Danzig, faith in Hitler and his secret plans of a counterstrike were quickly replaced by the grim reality of the rapidly approaching Red Army,
who would pass through their areas first on the way to Danzig. For Lehndorff, any hope
he had of a secret weapon disappeared with the arrival of the Red Army in Allenstein.
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He reported being woken by a loud noise: "It sounded as if many heavy trucks were
standing around the building with their motors running uninterruptedly ... this could only
mean the end." Lehndorff chose to escape north to Konigsberg rather than west to
Danzig, but described the evacuation from his home as a journey in which he felt that he
was witnessing "the end of all the places that mattered" to him. Unquestioning faith and
loyalty to the Fuhrer in the most desperate of situations certainly caused excessive
suffering and death for Germans at the end of the war. In Lehndorff s case, realization
that he had been led to believe falsely that Hitler would protect his home is manifested in
a profound sense of victimization through loss of Heimat.
The problem for refugees located in the eastern and southern areas of the Gau of
Danzig-West Prussia was that Soviet military strategy had devised a plan to push towards
Pomerania from the south, as well as from East Prussia, in an effort to cut off any land
escape from the Danzig region to the west. The cities south and east of Danzig, such as
Elbing, Marienwerder, and Marienberg were where the German 2nd Army made a last
ditch effort to keep the Red Army from driving towards the Pomeranian coast. Many
Germans in the east must have known that their window of opportunity to escape to the
west by land was closing fast and that desperate measures were needed in order to get to
Danzig. The testimony of a Major Janecke of the Wehrmacht Medical Corp, who was
dispatched from Danzig south to Marienwerder, reported harrowing images of refugees
bent on escaping by land before it was too late. Janecke wrote, " ... the roads were so
congested that for a time we tried to make headway across country and along field paths.
But even there, refugee treks were blocking the way. People of all kinds, on foot, leading
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fantastic vehicles, stragglers-on in an indescribable ghostly procession."56 Despite
difficult conditions, endless delays, and disease, refugees located in the south of the Gau
ofDanzig-West Prussia were willing to endure extreme conditions to escape to the Reich
by land.
For Germans in East Prussia, escape by land to Danzig was made even more
difficult than for their southern counterparts, by virtue ofthe geography of the Baltic
coast. By the last week in January it was becoming extremely difficult and dangerous for
refugees from the east Prussian coast to escape by land to Danzig except via the Frisches
HaJJ, a long strip of land that ran under frozen water parallel to the Prussian Baltic coast,

followed by the Nehrung road, both east of the city. These were places of memory where
East Prussian refugees experienced and witnessed great suffering to reach the city.
Danzig's myth as a safe haven certainly motivated many East Prussian Germans to
undergo such perils. Lore Ehrich wrote in 1946 and 1947 as an expellee in West
Germany, of her experience in escaping East Prussia with her family via the frozen HajJ
and the Nehrung. She stated, "Danzig was ... the goal laid down for refugees. There we
were to receive, clothes, coupons, and private billets."57

It is estimated that over half a million people fled over the icy and treacherous
Haffto Danzig in late January and early February. 58 The Haffhad been defended

tenaciously by the remnants of the German 2nd Army in retreat from the south and east.
Ehrich and her family decided to flee to Danzig from their horne in Sensburg, East
Prussia after the Red Army arrived on 28 January. Forced to make the journey by night,
Ehrich, her family, and fellow refugees traversed the HajJ which was lit by flares from
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the Luftwaffe. She described images ofhorses, wagons, and people, who had fallen into
the ice and frozen. Crossing the HajJ, which is about ten miles long, took two days
because the refugees had to avoid Russian bombers and fighters who tried to strafe and
detonate the ice so that it would break. The images of the Haffwould be followed by
another space of severe traumatic memory right afterwards, the Nehrung road, which
connected the southern end of the Haffwith Danzig's eastern suburbs. "Oh this awful
road!" recalled Ehrich as she described the poor conditions, deep mud, frequent halts and
delays, corpses by the side of the road, and an endless column of refugees. Finally,
Ehrich and her family reached Dirschau, on the outskirts of Danzig where she had to
threaten suicide in order to convince an SS officer to feed, clothe, and let her and her
children bathe, and then get them on a train to the city. 59
Ehrich's account displays the threshold of suffering many eastern Germans were
willing to confront and endure to reach Danzig. Rumors of its safety, provisions and
access to the sea certainly must have contributed to motivating thousands of refugees
such as Ehrich to go to such extremely dangerous measures such as to travel the HajJ and
the Nehrung road, as well as to threaten suicide, in order to reach the city. Upon reaching
Danzig, Ehrich and her family were taken in by relatives for a few weeks before boarding
a boat for Denmark. As a displaced person, Ehrich found the situation in Danzig at the
time to be stable and was comforted by the fact that "after all we had been through, the
few air-raids and the going down into the cellar was a trifle."60 Ehrich's sentiments
reflected a general trend among both city residents, as well as those who had survived the
trek to Danzig, that the city was safe for the foreseeable future.
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A sense of victimization by German refugees runs strongly through statements of
the pandemonium in trying to escape from Danzig to the west by land. One teacher from
Zoppot by the name ofllse Kohl made the decision to leave Danzig on New Year's Day.
Already the scene in and around the city had become chaotic as it took her and her family
five hours just to get from Zoppot to Danzig Central Station, a train-ride that would
normally take minutes. Ilse was then put on military transport that went first to
Gotenhafen and then to Rostock, which took several days instead of several hours, during
which time she and her family contracted scarlet fever. She wrote, "the guards kept
saying that it was too dangerous for us to travel, that Polish engine drivers were taking
trains full of refugees through the lines into the hands of the Russians ... but a soldier near
me said, 'don't lose your nerve, we are all in the same boat."61 In this passage, a German
teacher and soldier connect emotionally with each other by focusing on their own
victimization during the evacuation of a region, where both no doubt had served to
consolidate the Nazi regime. The memory ofllse and this unnamed, but poignant soldier,
while being transported find themselves representative of the east where Ilse had likely
spread and engrained Nazi ideology and where the soldier enforced and fought for it.
Their memories are also as traumatized refugees, expelled forever from their homes.
They would serve as the advertisers of a sense of German loss and suffering in the east.
By late January, it became more and more difficult to escape by land, making
evacuation by sea the more prevalent means of fleeing the Red Army advance. Tales of
Soviet acts of reprisal, violence, destruction, rape, and death brought by German refugees
from the city, motivated thousands to crowd the docks and quays ofDanzig, Gotenhafen,
and Hela, despite the fact the rumors of Soviet submarine activity in the Bay of Danzig,
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the Baltic and the North Sea were widespread. Fear of the ravages of the Soviet
onslaught, specifically the Red Army's propensity towards rape motivated thousands to
pursue the dangerous avenue of evacuation by sea at any cost. The account of Countess
zu Eulenberg, herself escaping from Neufahrwasser, a Danzig port in the western district
ofthe city, provides a description ofthe scene on the docks and beaches of the city. On
the beach through the snow all she could see was a horde of refugees, who had built a
tent city out of blankets amidst the snow covered sand dunes, desperate to escape the city:
" ... the crush to get on board was just terrible .. .I saw a pram being squeezed out
of all recognition by the pushing masses. One man fell into the water and there
was nothing one could do in the crush ... the Soviet guns and the Stormoviks
strafed, tearing great holes in the waiting ranks of the refugees. But nobody
moved, even death was less important than getting on board one of those boats.
Babies were being used as tickets, being carried on board, and then thrown down
again to be used as passports ... some fell between the ship and quayside. It
seemed not to matter ... " 62

The ship for which Eulenberg had witnessed such desperation and sacrifice to
board was the Wilhelm Gust/off Grand Admiral Donitz ordered several large luxury
liners to be activated to help get refugees and wounded soldiers back to the Reich on 21
January 1945, the largest and most well known being the Wilhelm Gust/off, named after a
Nazi functionary who had been assassinated in Switzerland by David Friedlander, a
Jewish student. 63 Soon after sailing from Gotenhafen, the ship was sunk by a Soviet
submarine off the Pomeranian coast on 30 January. It is estimated that over 7,000 people
lost their lives, making it the greatest maritime disaster up to that point.
Captained by one Friedrich Peterson, the ship set sail poorly equipped for the
rigors of the winter journey, the capacity of people aboard, and the threat of Soviet
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submarine activity. Donitz ordered the Gustloffbe made seaworthy and capable of
carrying thousands more than its original 1,465 passenger and 400 crew capacity
although the dangers of such an evacuation along the Pomeranian coast were known.
The ship left the docks with the escort ships Hansa, Hamburg and Deutschland on 30
January. The final passenger list aboard the Gust/off was 918 naval officers and men,
173 crew, 373 Women's Naval Auxiliaries, 162 wounded, and 4,424 refugees. While it
is known that a large percentage of the refugees on board hailed from various locations in
and nearby the Gau of Danzig-West Prussia, specific figures of how many actually were
on the ship when it sank remain hazy because it stopped at Hela before setting out into
the Baltic, to pick up approximately a thousand more refugees. 64 Donitz and the staff
who helped him plan the operation had little choice in planning the ship's navigational
route, other than to hug the coast, as the deeper waters were strewn with mines, yet the
planning team failed to arm the Gust/off or its escort ships or adequately equip her with
enough emergency life boats and preserves for all on board. 65 Poor planning of the
mission put pressure on the crew of the ship to perform and execute precisely in the event
of an emergency situation. 66
Alexander Marinesko, the commander of the Soviet S-13 submarine, is the Soviet
captain credited with sinking the Gust/off Marinesko's documented actions during the
sinking ofthe ship, as well as his own memory ofthe hunt for the Gust/off display hate
for the Germans. While the ship was carrying German military personnel, thus making it
a legitimate target, sinking the Gust/off and killing innocent civilians was for Marinesko
more than a mere assignment to destroy any ship suspected of coming to supply or
Dobson et all, 83-84.
Ibid, 83-84
66 Ibid, 67-70.
64

65

39

leaving to evacuate the pocket of German troops holding out in the east. The Soviet
literary journal Zvezda published Marinesko's war time experiences several years later.
Marinesko wrote, "We were prowling up and down the fascist lair. But the dogs
wouldn't come out and fight. I decided that next day I would take the war to them, get a
fix on the Hela lighthouse and sneak into the Danzig Bay itself. .. " 67 Marinesko had a
reputation for being a heavy drinker when on land, but a sober minded, ruthless, and loyal
Soviet comrade when at sea, who hated all Germans and the suffering their armies had
brought upon the Soviet Union. It took the S-13 about two hours to catch up with the
Gustloff, undetected as the ship's radar had frozen. As the Gustloffreached the waters
near the Stolp Bank, the S-13 fired three bow torpedoes on the boat's port side, all of
which found their mark. Reportedly, Marinesko ordered that the submarine stay, so that
he could watch the ship sink, despite the fact that he knew the Kriegsmarine would soon
send re-enforcements, a decision which no doubt put his submarine and its crew in
jeopardy. Marinesko later torpedoed the Steuben, claiming another 3,000 wounded and
terrified Germans from the east. The man himself is responsible for the deaths of around
10,000 Germans. 68 Marinesko's actions, when juxtaposed with his statement above,
certainly suggest a vendetta he felt he was enacting against the Third Reich and Germans
from the east. He expresses a general sentiment branded into the Soviet officer corps
which saw all Germans as "fascist dogs," who needed to feel the ravages of war brought
upon their soil and seas, just as Soviet memory experienced during the German invasion
of the U.S.S.R earlier in the war.
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While Marinesko's memory of the sinking of the Gust/off seemed to focus on a
vendetta for Soviet victimhood, German memory of the events at sea that night display a
sense of German victimhood, which completely ignored Soviet suffering. After the
explosions, the scene onboard the Gustloffmust have been one of pure panic and
pandemonium, in total darkness and windy minus eighteen-degrees Fahrenheit weather.
Many survivors reported that the ship's crew, rather than try and save peoples' lives,
caused more to drown through ineptness in handling an emergency situation, as well as
through their own sense of self-preservation. The first thing Captain Peterson ordered
was to try and seal up the ship's leakage compartments. This trapped wounded soldiers
and refugees below deck to drown. After failing to seal up the gashes in the ship's side,
Peterson himself escaped to a lifeboat. Many of the ship's crew immediately decided to
shirk their duties and jump aboard lifeboats to save themselves, even though an order had
been issued to allow women and children to board the lifeboats first. Reportedly, one
lifeboat that could have held fifty, hit the water with twelve sailors. 69 There were also
reports of armed sailors aboard lifeboats who clubbed or shot at swimmers trying to
board their boats, for fear they would capsize or tip. The Admiral Hipper responded to
the Gust/off's SOS signal, itselftransporting 1,377 refugees and 152 dock workers to
Kiel. At the last minute, the Hipper's captain received word that Soviet submarine
activity was still threatening the scene of the sinking Gust/off The ship pressed onwards,
causing many who were still alive in the water, to drown in its wake. 70
German memory of the sinking Gust/off recalled that for many, suicide was
preferable to drowning or freezing to death. Heinz Schoen, who interviewed survivors of
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the disaster after the war in West Germany, spoke to a sailor who had run below deck to
try and save those who were trapped. He un-jammed a door, to hear a pistol shot and
discovered, " ... on the floor lay the bodies of a woman and a small child. In the center of
the cabin was a naval officer holding a still smoking pistol while a terrified five-year old
clutched his father's leg ... (I) had interrupted on a family suicide pact."71 Other
methods of suicide on board the sinking ship were recorded by Schoen. Engineer Officer
Walter Knust stated that the deck of the boat was very icy and many stumbled and slid
off the sides. Since it had been so hot below deck, the shock of coming outside to such
cold conditions, often severely underclothed, caused many people who jumped or fell
into the water to die on contact. 72 Knust wrote that many who were aware of the deadly
frigid conditions outside used the elements instead of a pistol to commit suicide: "When
we got to the boat deck it was swarming with passengers. I saw some of them even take
off their clothes before they plunged into the water and they must have died at once."73
Descriptions and memory of the Gust/off's final moments also display a sense of
German victimhood. The ship took just over an hour to sink and at the last minute an
explosion in the engine room knocked the lights on the ship back on. 74 Witnesses
described the scene as a fully lit ship, shining onto a sea of frozen bodies floating in the
water, mixed with screaming ofthose struggling on the surface who hadn't succumbed to
hypothermia. Both Dobson and the other authors of The Cruelest Night, as well as
Gunter Grass have speculated that the image of the brightly lit Wilhelm Gust/off sinking
into the Baltic amidst the screams of German victims is a metaphor for the ultimate
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failure and downfall of the Third Reich at large. These authors also note in their
respective works on the topic of the memory of the sinking Gustloffthat after the German
U-boat T -36 surfaced to pick up survivors, sailors on board helped deliver several babies
of pregnant women who had survived the sinking of the ship. 75 German memory has
highlighted this phenomenon ofthe survival of these newborns as symbolic ofthe
inheritance of victimization in which they were the ultimate survivors of the Gustloffwho
would carry on the memory of the German maritime disaster at the war's end. While it is
not known exactly how many people perished, it is know that 964 were defiantly saved,
including these newborns. 76 These survivors, who were both directly and indirectly
victimized by this tragedy, would take their memories of the Gust!off and recreate it for
German post-war memory at large, without considering why the ship was torpedoed.
The case of the Wilhelm Gustloffis an instance where both Soviet and German
memory of the war would focus on their own respective victimization. For Marinesko,
sinking this ship was a way to achieve both a military objective, as well as fulfill a
national agenda of Soviet retribution for the German war crimes in the U.S.S.R.
Marinesko probably would not even have been in the position as the captain of the
submarine, had he not possessed the nerve to order the torpedoing of a ship where
thousands of innocent civilians would die. Likewise, it would be equally unthinkable to
expect a German refugee aboard the sinking Gustloff, witnessing all the horrors disaster
around them, to stop and consider that the root cause of such a tragedy stemmed from
Soviet suffering, inflicted by Germans. Yet, post-war memory of this event by both the
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Soviet perpetrators and Germans victims forget that the Soviet Union had also been a
victim and Germany a perpetrator of equally reprehensible war crimes.
Following the Wilhelm Gustlofftragedy, Nazi high command decided to
discontinue any further evacuations on the 1 February, officially denying Danzig's
already bulging refugee population an option for escape. Danzig's population fluctuated
so much that any estimate during these days is bound to be skewed. However, refugees
continued to pour into the city by the thousands. Historians estimate that by 8 February,
there were 35,000-40,000 refugees in the city, two days later this figure jumped to
approximately 400,000. 77 By mid-February, it has been estimated, 1 to 2 million
permanent residents and displaced persons were in Danzig. 78 Hitler's edict to suspend
further evacuations trapped many refugees in the city. Those refugees who were
temporarily living in Danzig or awaiting departure must have interpreted Hitler's
decision as a sign that the front had stabilized. This belief was in addition to the fact that
even in February, Danzig was still certainly a safe haven in war tom Prussia by any
standards. 79
The decision making of the Fuhrer was no doubt highly compromised by
dementia, stubbornness, and pride, especially when it came to Danzig, a place which he
had gone to great lengths to bring back to Germany. The extent to which Hitler was in
complete denial of the situation in the city is illustrated by the decision he made in midFebruary. He had already decided that all naval construction and testing in the bay had
become useless and ordered submarine units around Danzig to be evacuated immediately
to Liibeck. Yet, he had not officially reactivated refugee evacuation from the Baltic.
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Koslin, in Pomerania fell on 7 March, officially closing the pocket and making all land
escape from East of West Prussia completely impossible. 80 Only then did Hitler order
that Danzig's "Target Sanctuary" would be Copenhagen, Denmark.81 Hitler had refused
to accept the dire situation there and only ordered the Luftwaffe to drop supplies
minimally, which in many instances were looted by German soldiers. 82
In order to promote survival, or to salvage something positive from the dire
situation in Danzig, many individuals from across the spectrum ofthe German military
and civilian sector, defied Hitler's orders and edicts. Refugees who had fervently
believed in Hitler and his ability to repel the Red Army, seemed convinced at the war's
end, whether by tales of trauma on land or sea at the hands of the Soviets, that Danzig's
fate was sealed. Hitler's decision to halt all further evacuations was ignored by both the
military leadership and the people trying to flee the city. The Kriegsmarine launched

Operation Sonnenwende on 16 February in an attempt to rescue all wounded soldiers,
refugees, and residents from the city in one fell swoop. On 21 February, 51,000
reportedly left the city. 83
Realization of the city's fate, through traumatic events can be interpreted in two
ways. First, it may be an expression of individual survival and profiteering motives,
which are often related. People crowded the docks ofDanzig, dressing as pregnant
women, borrowing other peoples' babies, inflicting wounds on themselves, threatening
suicide, or committing whatever extreme measure it took to get on board a boat. At the
same time crime was rampant in Danzig. City officials, who were busy building defenses
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and devoting manpower to slowing down the Red Army advance, were no longer able to
prevent widespread corruption, looting, and the emergence of a vibrant black market. 84
The SS were on patrol with vigilance, willing to execute anyone who did bravely assume
a role in helping to defend Danzig. Nonetheless, an overall decrease in authority and an
increase in the overall awareness of the traumatic future that Danzig would eventually
experience, resulted in a mentality of deterministic individualism, manifesting itself in
extreme self-preservation and/or individual opportunism.
Second, defiance ofNazi laws, edicts, and behavior by Germans at the end of the

.

war may be indicative of a mindset which sought to distance Danzig and its people from
Hitler, Nazism, and overall guilt in the last months ofthe city's existence. Hans von
Lehndorffhad already witnessed this dynamic at his new post at a hospital in Insterburg
where a nurse under him interpreted the advance of the Russians as holding at least one
positive outcome. She assumed that all high ranking Nazis would probably fly away
beforehand: "Thank God, we are rid ofthem! At least we can breathe freely!" 85 This
woman clearly did not hold the Nazis in high regard anymore and that they were a
foreign entity who would not be missed. Prior to the Russian ransacking of his hospital
in late March, Lehndorff reported that all his co-workers had begun to prepare for the
inevitable. "On a table in their dining room stood a photograph of Churchill and
everybody was busy learning Russian words of welcome." 86
Danzigers as well as lay Germans who were not native to the city seemed to show
a specific resentment at the war's end for Nazi leadership. The testimony of Hans
Gliewe, a refugee from Stolp in Pomerania, who had fled to Danzig, described trying in
Tighe, 188.
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vain to find a shelter during an air raid: "We went from door to door looking for a place.
Many people slammed the door in our faces when they heard we were from old German
territory. They called us Nazis and blamed us for everything that had happened to
Danzig."87 By singling out a Reichsdeutsche (Germans who had been born in or who had
citizenship of Germany proper) such as Gliewe, Danzigers at the last minute had decided
that they had never been part of the foreign German sphere in the first place and that
being invaded and annexed in 1939 was something Germany forced upon Danzig. Denial
of protection for people from outside Danzig and placing the burden of guilt upon their
shoulders at the last minute may have been motivated by traumatic memory as well. By
early March, reports, rumors, and eyewitnesses had appraised almost everyone in Danzig
of the level of anti-German ferocity that should be expected, should the city fall. Fear of
these reprisals ultimately had to have been the most significant factor for this last minute
switch of allegiances, denial of guilt, and hostility towards the Nazi superstructure and its
perceived agents.

The sinking ofthe Wilhelm Gust/off seems to be the most prominent military
event in Danzig history and memory during the early months of 1945. Yet, one of the
world's worst maritime disasters to date is relatively unknown and forgotten outside of
German history and memory. Gunter Grass reminded the world of the events in his 2001
novella Im Krebs gang, (Crabwalk). Although fictitious, it is a formulation of Grass's
version ofthe events while finding a way to couch them into three generations of German
history, as witnessed by survivors of the sinking ship and their descendents. Using the
Danzig tragedy ofthe torpedoing ofthe Gustloffand its meaning for German memory,
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Grass's most recent work questions the evolution of this memory. In the process, Grass
is critical ofways in which historians revisit and report events such as the sinking ofthis
ship so symbolic to the victimization ofDanzig's Germans. In Im Krebsgang, Grass goes
well beyond the sinking of the Gust/off, using this tragedy as a platform by which to
expose the hermeneutical problems of German history and memory fifty years after the
events outside Danzig.
Im Krebsgang is the story ofPaul Pokriefke, a journalist born the night the

Gust/off sank. His mother Tulia was one of the pregnant women rescued who
subsequently gave birth that night. Paul, representative of the 1960s generation of WestGermans that had rejected notions of German victimhood, had always been uninterested
in his mother's victimization embodied in survivor culture, history, or memory passed
down about the tragedy. Paul's son Konrad however becomes very interested in the
topic, via the internet. Konrad creates a website and subsequently becomes obsessed
with the assassination of Wilhelm Gustloffby the Jewish student activist David
Friedlander. Konrad embodies the third generation of inherited German victimhood,
continuing the memory of the tragedy. Paul, who was divorced and did not live with
Konrad, can only watch as his son moves towards extreme right wing politics. Konrad
uses his computer as both a research tool and an information and media outlet, all the
while encouraged by Tulia's insistence that the memories of her experience not
disappear. Konrad meets a fellow virtual historian in an internet chatroom who claims to
be Jewish and is researching Friedlander. After weeks of debating each other over the
internet on the merits of German perpetration versus Jewish victimhood, the two decide
to meet face to face, where Konrad premeditatedly shoots and kills the other boy. In
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admitting his crime Konrad claimed to be revenging the assassination of Gustloff fifty
years earlier. During Konrad's incarceration, Paul discovers that a website exists
honoring Konrad's act and martyring his imprisonment. Like the sinking of the Gust/off,
Konrad himself has become a part of the canon of German suffering and memory. The
final words of the book ominously read," It doesn't end. Never will it end."88
First and foremost the title of the book, Im Krebsgang can be interpreted as a
metaphor for doing any form of historical research and remembrance for a tragedy such
as the sinking of the Wilhelm Gust/off The last months of the war were highly confusing,
complex, and controversial times to examine as they are possessed by multiple versions
of German, Polish, Soviet and Jewish traumatic memory. 89 Grass sums up the process
his protagonist Paul must face in working through the memory of the events of his son' s
troubled life, his life, and the historical event of the sinking Gust/off
"Ifi really have to settle my own historical accounts now, everything I messed up
is going to be ascribed to the sinking of a ship .. .But I'm still not sure how to go
about this: should I do as I was taught and unpack one life at a time, in order or do
I have to sneak up on time in a crabwalk, seeming to go backward but actually a
scuttling sideways, and thereby working my way forward fairly rapidly" 90

As crabs walk sideways, Grass is commenting on the various angles one could approach
and work through such topics, considering different versions of memory, from different
time periods, held by various ethnic groups, each claiming a different memory of this
incident. 9 1 Grass, through his protagonist, is assuming the role of the historian and brings
the methodology of research and scholarship, and the process of secondary memory into
question.
Gunter Grass, Crabwalk, trans. by Krishna Winston, (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Inc. 2001), 234.
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Grass's imagery of the ways in which the right-wing had warped the memory of
German victimization after the war portrays computer savvy skinheads debating in virtual
reality. Paul begins to suspect his son's involvement in right wing political debate when
he visits a neo-Nazi webpage and reads the debates that ensued in the site's chat-room.
He views statements which seemed to reclaim or warp history: "more ludicrous than
disgusting." Paul narrates that, "Soon battles raged between the right and left wings of
the chatters. A virtual Night of the Long Knives took its toll."92
As Paul investigates his son's online activities, the protagonist is reminded how as
a child, Tulia had tried to force him into the role of a historian and receptacle of the
secondary memory of his mother's trauma. Paul also had to inherit a memory which his
mother did not herself witness, but heard about afterwards, such as the particularly
gruesome death of the Naval Auxiliary girls sleeping in the dry pool on the ship. As he
narrates; "Because I have known, ever since the childhood my mother imposed on me,
that the second torpedo struck the swimming pool and transformed its tiles and pieces of
mosaic into deadly missiles ... " 93 Visual imagery of a scene so terrible seems to have
caused Tulia to empathize with these particular victims within her own tragedy. Her own
experience was so traumatic, that she assumed the role of an eye-witness because of this
empathy. Paul, as the token fact gatherer, had to work through and live with such
memories from this complex perspective. The role of the historian, which the neo-Nazis
on the website had hijacked, was one which Paul had rejected all his life but was forced
to assume in order to save his son's inherited memory.
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Grass levels a great deal of criticism at the right-wing and their incomplete and
one-sided historical remembrance of German victimhood. At one point in the novel, Paul
tries to approach Konrad when he had proof of his son's involvement in right wing
activism. His son replied, "I'm doing historical research."94 For Grass, the role of a
historian of German suffering in Crabwalk, as in post war Germany had been
championed by right wing revanchism, arm chair historians, and troubled teenagers
searching for identity on the internet-all of whom had attached themselves to the memory
of German victimization during the war's end. Grass uses Konrad's sudden interest in
the trauma Grandma Tulia experienced, as an example of this version of history which
only focuses on crimes against Germans and not their guilt. Proper scholarship which
had worked through the event of 30 January 1945 would have considered that in many
ways German crimes had indirectly caused the Gustloffto be torpedoed and sunk. 95
In Im Krebs gang, Grass specifically addresses the shortcomings of Christopher
Dobson's, John Miller's, and Ronald Payne's study of the Gustlofftragedy: The Cruelest
Night. This study was written by a group of British historians in 1979, twenty-two years
prior to the publication of Im Krebs gang. These historians were perhaps motivated by
the lack of serious study on the topic, and decided to take Schoen's interviews,
documents available from both Berlin and Moscow, as well as other accounts and write
the first complete secondary history ofthe tragedy. On the Cruelest Night, Grass
comments that," .. .written by three Englishmen. But even this documentation of the
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catastrophe, which I must admit was written factually but too emotionlessly .. .It's all too
impersonal; nothing comes from the heart."96
Grass's assessment of the The Cruelest Night, though a good secondary source
full of factual names, dates, statistics, and descriptions, focuses on its overall banal,
matter-of-factually, stoic, and at times boring history of the sinking of the Gust/off For
instance, the authors of The Cruelest Night spend some time working through the
question ofwhether the torpedoing ofthe Gustloffcould be considered a war crime.
Although the study takes no clear stand on the question, it does point out and seems to
agree with the findings of an investigation conducted by the Institut fiir Seerecht in Kiel
after the war. The Institute had concluded that the hundreds of naval submarine
specialists on board, as well as the non-registration of the Wilhelm Gust/off as a hospital
ship made it a viable target for Marinesko. 97
The idea of deserved death or historical justice against the Germans, as no doubt
propagated by Marinesko and Soviet memory of World War II, would be very difficult to
substantiate on a moral or logical level. To invoke a "serves them right" polemic, in the
context of correct military behavior is too reductionist and does not properly work
through the idea of comparing German losses with Soviet losses, both as a result of the
war. Grass's historiographical comment and stylistic critique of Dobson, Miller, and
Payne's work can be interpreted as a critique of traumatic history at large. Furthermore,
Im Krebsgang is a general criticism of the ways in which historians have assumed the
duties of reporting on and the format in which they present topics such as the sinking of
the Gust/off, and other multi-layered traumatic memories.
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Another issue within the context of researching the Gustlofftragedy and German
suffering that Grass pokes fun at is the use of accuracy of statistics, specifically death
rates, and survival rates in setting the parameters of victimhood. Paul recalled
that," ... Mother really had no idea by whom she was pregnant when she set out on the
morning of January 30th 1945 with her parents, leaving Gotenhafen/Oxoft pier as
passenger number seven thousand such-and-such."98 Priority of memory is being
analyzed here by Grass in terms of whether the memories of where and when Tulia
boarded the ship are reliable or even important. This is juxtaposed with who Paul's real
fathers is, which nobody knows to this day and are ultimately moot points. Grass also
paints a scene of the docks near the Gustloff as being completely chaotic and any registry
of those boarding was bound to be skewed. "You wouldn't believe the pushing and
shoving, total confusion. In the beginning they were keeping a neat list-everyone who
came up the gangway-but even the paper ran out. .. "99 For Grass, "numbers are never
accurate, in the end you always have to guess .. .it didn't matter and it still doesn't." 100
In Im Krebs gang, Grass raises a number of general questions pertaining to the
role, reliability and shortcomings of the historian/fact finder of victimhood and traumatic
memory. Why remember the Gustloffwithin the context of the trauma during the end of
the war brought upon the city of Danzig and its population? Is this tragedy significantly
part ofDanzig history? Konrad Pokriefke felt that as the agent of historical reportage,
"any strand of the plot having to do directly or loosely with victimization of Germans
fleeing from the city of Danzig and its environs should be (his) concern." 101 According
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to Grass, German memory through research and recreation of victimization symbolized
by a maritime disaster is inherently flawed. That to research traumatic events at the war's
end, no matter how disconnected to these events Germans actually were, they could not
help but possess a sole version of that memory, which denied Soviet, Polish, or Jewish
suffering.
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The Destruction of Danzig

As March of 1945 began, the citizens of Danzig were preparing to witness war
directly for the first time in the city's modem history as the Soviet

1st

and 2nd Armies

pushed eastward and northward from Pomerania and Elbing respectively. By then,
Danzig bulged with refugees and wounded soldiers from the east, each with their
traumatic memories ofRussian assaults in other eastern German territories. The
memories ofDanzig Germans of these final days ofthe city's existence would focus on
their own victimization. This victimization was manifested through stories of rape,
murder, robbery, and destruction which saturated the city, causing a pre-traumatic terror
syndrome to occur before the Russian armies approached. As the Red Army closed in on
Danzig and its suburbs, the Germans in Danzig displayed reticence both to defend their
city, as well as to carry out the scorched-earth policy demanded by Hitler for
Gotenhafen/Gdynia in the face of certain defeat. Danzigers' sense of wartime
victimization was confirmed with the appearance of Russian troops in the city. Upon
taking the city, the Red Army brought the rumors of their terror to life in the streets and
basements of the city. The Russians would force Danzigers to witness the destruction of
their city as an object lesson for their co-operation and support of Hitler. However, the
German authors ofthe statements and documents from the fall ofDanzig, as a whole
neglect their own participation in the Nazi regime in favor of a memory which made
Danzigers the victims ofthe end of World War II. Additionally, Poles who still remained
in the city experienced the ferocity of the Russian siege in much the same way as their
German counterparts. In Danzig, memories of the destruction of the city would manifest
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themselves through Christian martyrdom at the hands of the atheistic Soviets.
Ultimately, the memory of destruction, violence, and rape during the last month of the
city's existence as Danzig heralded its final hours and define those who suffered through
it.
All winter long Danzig stood in relative safety, but it had been flooded with
refugees from East Prussia and the Baltic states fleeing the invasion of the Red Army.
Even before there was any real Soviet military threat to the immediate Danzig region, the
residents, refugees and displaced persons in the city began reacting to the impending loss
of the war with apprehension and fear. One might call it a pre-traumatic stress syndrome,
which military psychologist Philip Zimbardo describes, "that prolonged state of worry
about one's vulnerability without any clear action to alter it can have a profoundly
negative impact on our individual and collective mental health." 102 This appeared to be
the case in Danzig, particularly in preparing a defense of the city.
Under these conditions, German authorities, including Gauleiter Albert Forster
and General von Saucker, who was given authority over Forster in the task of defending
Danzig, found widespread popular resistance to their demands that the city's current
population of a million-and-half people participate in the defense. When the mobilization
ofDanzig's Volkssturm units began, city authorities found widespread reluctance to
volunteer. Although the Elbing Volkssturm had been tenacious in the defense of that
town, Danzigers seemed reluctant to participate voluntarily. Ads in the Danziger

Vorposten newspaper on 8 March asked all former officers or men with any military
experience to join their local units, as the city did not have sufficient volunteers to even
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attempt a defense against the Red Army. 103 This refusal may have been indicative of a
general resistance toward defending an indefensible military strongpoint as well as an
attempt by Danzigers to distance themselves from the Nazis at the last moment.
Danzigers' separation from the Nazi cause gained powerful re-enforcement after
Nazi officials responded to popular reticence to defend their city from Soviet invasion by
forcing Danzig's male residents to participate or die. Although most of Danzig's 91h SS
Police Division had been evacuated to defend Berlin, Forster held onto 450 ofthese
diehard Nazis, who went door to door pressing men and boys of all ages into service,
shooting or hanging all who disobeyed. Most victims of this form of German suffering,
as a direct result ofNazism, were males, some as young as fourteen or as old as eighty,
many ofwhom were reportedly just going home to eat. 104 The SS in Danzig established a
makeshift tribunal in the Central Railway Station and often hung those found guilty from
trees on prominent streets. One famous anonymously taken photo shows several men
hanging in Danzig's Hindenburg Allee, with cards around their necks which read, "I hang
here because I left my unit;" "I betrayed the Fatherland;" or "I am a cowardly traitor." 105
Such arbitrary violence undoubtedly reinforced some Danzigers' perceptions that they
were victims rather than participants in the German war effort. Lajica Lewandowska,
who claimed to have seen many such bodies, marked as traitors, hanging from trees of
various streets since January, remarked feeling sorry for the Germans, even though she
and her family had been repressed by them. 106 Even after the war, when Lewandowska
recalled seeing German soldiers who had been captured and being marched away she
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stated, " .. .it was kind of saddening, I felt empathy for them, they were a very proud race,
they weren't sulking, they marched, they sang. They were still proud." 107 For
Lewandowska, witnessing the suffering of German Danzigers, that was reminiscent of
the ways she, her family, and other Poles had suffered for the last decade, caused her to
see her oppressors as fellow victims.
In neighboring Zoppot, this new sense of the Vistula Delta-Germans' sense of
victimization sometimes gave way to confusion and tragically desperate solutions. As the
Red Army advanced down the beach through Zoppot, General Rokossovsky had decided
to drop leaflets all over the city to warn residents not to resist the Soviet invasion. In
response, Hitler decided to also canvas the city with leaflets, which described Russian
atrocities in detail and urged their readers to defend Danzig to the last. The most direct
result of this competition for the cooperation of the city's citizens, through the saturation
by leaflets, was high suicide rates in the month of March, particularly, though not
surprisingly, among women. 108
Animosity towards Poles and memory of the pre-war economic rivalry between
the Free City of Danzig and Polish Gdynia dictated a different Nazi response to the
Soviet advance on the port of Gotenhafen, a response which ultimately evoked feelings of
victimization, even in those directly responsible for the war's violence. In this part of the
greater Danzig region, German colonists and refugees who remained appeared not
initially to have fallen in to the growing sense of victimization that marked the German
inhabitants of both Danzig and Elbing. On 19 March, as the Red Army began its push
upon the port city's suburbs shelling the main market in Gotenhafen, reportedly causing a

10 7
108

Ibid.
Tighe, 190-191.

58

stampede of livestock throughout the city. The Germans who had not fled Gotenhafen
knew that the city would certainly fall and proceeded to destroy as much of the city and
the port as possible, so that it would not fall into the hands of the Soviets and to derail
any future Polish rebuilding projects of the city. 109 As mentioned in the previous chapter,
Gotenhafen had been heavily germanized after the Nazi takeover of the former Polish
Corridor, when ethnic Germans had been resettled into the former Polish port city of
Gdynia. Although, most of the city's new residents therefore undoubtedly had little or no
direct recollection of or relationship with the ways the interwar Polish government had
used the city of Gdynia to compete against and surpass Danzig in economic prosperity,
inherited memory infused with hatred for the Poles and their inter-war existence, spurred
the city's residents to submit to Nazi orders to destroy Gotenhafen before it finally fell on
26 March. The Germans in Gotenhafen made a decision to perpetrate a vendetta-laden
scorched-earth policy, designed to effect negatively Russian invasion efforts and future
Polish rebuilding efforts. This decision indicates that not all of the Danzig region's
German inhabitants submitted to either pre-traumatic stress syndrome or to feelings of
victimization and therefore separation from the Nazi war effort.
Nonetheless, some who witnessed the destruction of Gotenhafen displayed a
memory of the events which focused not on German retribution or perpetration of
destruction and trauma but instead exclusively on German suffering. These witnesses, as
a result, tended to further German ideas that they, no matter their ideological persuasions,
had become the war's victims rather than its perpetrators and beneficiaries. A soldier
retreating from Memel, who had participated in the scorched-earth policy in Gotenhafen,
witnessed the birth of a child amidst the fire and explosions. He wrote, "If the birth of a
109
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child is usually a joyful event, this particular birth only seemed to add to the general
tragedy, the mother's screams no longer had any meaning in a world of screams, and the
wailing child seemed to regret the beginning of its life." 110 It is not unlikely that this
soldier participated in other traumatic activities on the eastern front, as well as in the
senseless destruction of a place which symbolized modern Polish economic prosperity
and success. Yet, his concern at the time was for the tragedy inherent in the birth of a
German baby, born in the midst of a battle zone and not for the trauma caused by the
torching of Gotenhafen. The fact that the soldier has dubbed the place in which this baby
has born as a "world of screams" underlines how even those responsible for the city's
destruction saw themselves as victims of the city's incineration.
German Danzigers' sense of victimization grew during this last week of March as
the Red Army began bombing, shelling, and employing other methods to weaken the city
center's defenses and the morale of its citizens. As residents sought refuge in basements
and air-raid shelters, a culture of terror emerged, even before those in cellars encountered
Russian soldiers, which reinforced feelings of victimhood. While air raids had occurred
in the city every night during the month of March, the night ofthe twenty-fifth was
reportedly the worst in terms of Russian shelling and other methods of weakening the
defense ofthe city and the morale of its residents. That night, the old wooden and halftimber buildings in Danzig's historic city center burned like kindling wood according to
eyewitness testimony. One witness now saw the basement shelters as death traps,
emphasizing: "We had to get out of the cellar because our house was on fire and we
thought we would get crushed or burnt. We didn't want to get caught. When we got into
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the open air we saw that everything was burning and the smoke nearly choked us." 111
Gisela Lehmann, in contrast, described being forced into a cellar by the fires caused by
the Russian siege. Her family's home had been destroyed in early March by Soviet
shelling and as a result they had been living in someone's basement all month. Lehmann
also recounted how the crowded basements appeared increasingly dangerous as the city
burned: "We stayed there without interruption day and night and languished while being
fired on constantly, in fear that we would almost be buried by the debris of the house
above us. My younger siblings almost had to lie on top of each other in the cold
basement since the few remaining houses were protecting thousands ofpeople." 112 Fires
had forced Gisela Lehmann, her brother Siegfried, as well as their mother and friends into
crowded basements that became fire traps in the midst of Russian invasion.
The parameters of fear and terror expanded when news reached basements that
the Russian infantry had arrived. News of their arrival was especially harrowing to
women of all ages who had heard rumors about how German women had suffered greatly
at the hands of the Red Army in the east. Danzig women had been made privy to other
refugee's tales of the Red Army's reputation for robbery and for sexual violence and soon
realized they would become the war's next victims. Gisela Lehmann recalled that below
ground, "The news came that Russians had reached us .... The entire population inside the
basement moved ever closer together and since they were only women and screaming
children, this was a terrible sight to behold." 113 Gisela recalled that after the Russians
had killed the German soldiers assigned to defend their basement, they immediately
grabbed the women and girls and began raping them. Gisela's mother, who was pregnant
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at the time, was also not spared this trauma even though she refused and fought against
them, capitulating only when the Russians threatened to shoot her and her children. 114
Anna Schwartz similarly remembered the sexual violence associated with the Red
Army's arrival in Danzig. On 29 March 1945, the day Danzig fell, she, like most others
had been living in an air-raid shelter "in fear of the future." Schwartz and the others in
the air-raid shelter knew that although Russian firing and bombing of the city had ceased
above ground, Red Army troops and tanks were proceeding through the streets of Danzig,
killing, raping, and robbing. As Russian tanks drove around town with soldiers
demanding that all Danzigers surrender through loudspeakers as Strauss waltzes playing
in the background, Red Army soldiers who smelled of alcohol entered Schwartz's cellar
calling "Urr! Urr!" and hastily robbed her. Fifteen minutes later another group of
soldiers robbed her again. " ... Meanwhile we heard the shrieks of women, who were
being raped," she recounted. Ordered out of cellar by the Russians, and robbed once
more, Schwartz, as she proceeded out into the street, noted how Soviet soldiers were now
using the remnants of shelled buildings to take women captive and to rape them: "Paying
no heed to death around us, we went past burning houses, Russian tanks, guns, and
soldiers who absolutely wanted to drag us into the houses." 115
Soviet rape in Danzig was blind towards ethnicity and this blindness undoubtedly
brought many German victims closer to the Poles they had formerly repressed, thereby
increasing their sense of war-time victimization. Gerhard Nitschke, a Danzig Pole, who
had witnessed and experienced Soviet violence more directly than Lewandowska during
the siege of the city, described a 29 March rape and murder of his cousin in a basement
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by a Soviet soldier: "scenes took place, which we already knew out of many other
reports: looting, robbery of watches and jewelry and rape of almost all women, who were
hauled up into the dwelling. For us, who were at the time still unsuspecting children,
these were traumatic incidents; as result ofthe many rapes my fifteen-year-old [female]
cousin is dead." 116 Lajica Lewandowska, was lucky enough to have had fled Danzig
prior to the Soviet invasion, escaping to a farmhouse near Putzig, well north of the city
but experienced the suffering ofthe indiscriminate rape of Polish women vicariously.
She recalled that after the war when Poles from Gdansk reunited, they often asked one
another questions such as "how many Russians raped you?" 117 When we consider the
accounts from Schwartz, Nitschke, Lehmann and Lewandowska we can conclude that
rape was a shared suffering between German and Polish women in 1945. Many of the
German families and women who were victimized sexually by Red Army troops didn't
see themselves as perpetrators of the war because they were now suffering equally with
Polish families and women.
Germans in Danzig, moreover, appeared incapable of seeing their victimization as
war retribution and instead attributed it to the supposed racial and cultural inferiority of
Soviet troops. Anna Schwartz, for instance, in the account above attributed Russian rapes
to "Mongols" or "Asiatics." For her to claim that such racist language rooted German
rape victims in Nazi rhetoric and thinking and thus stripping away Germans' innocence,
overlooks the universality of these claims. On one level, Poles too, resorted to similarly
racist language to explain why Soviet soldiers had raped family members. Nitschke, for
example, described the soldier who perpetrated the burglaries and rapes in his cellar
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during Easter week as "Mongo1." 118

The descriptions and recreations of the rape of

women in Danzig universally, perpetrated in German and Polish testimony by Russians
with so-called "Asiatic features," reveal a latent sense of racism within the statements of
these young Germans and Poles. Although this racism could be the result ofNazi
propaganda and indoctrination efforts, historians can assume that for many civilian
Danzigers, who had been exposed to and supported Nazi racist ideology and who had
limited to null experiences interacting with Soviet citizens, simply being around a racially
foreign entity was shocking. The additional trauma of being raped by such a person must
only have added to the shame and psychological trauma of such a violation and
contributed to victims later efforts to transform the perpetrators of sexual violence into a
racially different 'other.'
The context of racial sciences in the early part of the twentieth century, which
placed great importance on the relationship between race and ethnicity as well as on their
supposedly corresponding physical features, also undoubtedly defined some of the way in
which German and Poles subsequently remembered their victimization. The
overwhelming emphasis on racialist thought throughout Europe in this period can be seen
in the reporting ofBritishjoumalist Alexander Werth, The Times

corre~pondent,

who in

spite of his best effort to attribute Soviet soldiers indiscriminate raping of German and
Polish women to their linguistic limitations, nonetheless also informed readers that the
military rapists were "Mongols." He rationalized the rapes of Polish women to the Allied
coalition by explaining that because most of the Soviet soldiers were Asian, they did not
speak Polish or German, much less proper Russian, and subsequently could not tell the
difference between the two languages and thus raped Germans and Poles
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indiscriminately. Werth, though, also noted that Asiatic troops were the worst when it
came to committing violence and rape; and thus also resorted to portraying a foreign,
uncultured "other" in his reporting of the rapes. 119
Religious differences also played an important role in many Danzigers' efforts to
transform Soviet soldiers into barbaric "others," efforts which only furthered their sense
of difference and victimization. Poles and Germans, for instance, tended to juxtapose
their fervent Christian beliefs with Soviet atheism, and frequently attributed God's
intervention for saving them from the Bolshevik horde. Nitschke, for example, included
the traumatic memory of rape within the context of Christian faith in his testimony,
noting that these events occurred over the course of the Catholic Holy Week, implying
that the Soviets as Asians and as atheists had little respect for European Christian
traditions and practices. "On Maundy Thursday ...the first Mongolian soldier stepped
into our cellar, till well into the early house of the morning on Good Friday." 120 Siegfried
Lehmann, who had watched Soviet soldiers rape his pregnant mother and sister, later
asserted that his Christian faith had saved the family from subsequently being murdered
by them. He claimed God had intervened on behalf of his family: "We only escaped
being shot because I sang Church Hymns as I stood waiting to be shot." 121 His sister
Gisela's account states that the Russians spared the Lehmann family because their
Grandmother volunteered herself to be raped. 122 To the obviously religious Lehmann
family, Soviet destruction of Danzig's churches stood out as the most injurious and
visually evident examples of Russian atheism and barbarity because it represented a
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direct and visually evident attack on Christianity. The Russians, who had caught the
Lehmanns and their fellow survivors, separated them into groups, and marched them up
onto the Bishofs hills at the southwestern edge of Danzig where the "Stalinorgans" had
been pummeling the city and the last German military strongpoints, to watch at gunpoint,
"How our beautiful city was lit by fire and burnt to the ground. Danzig itself with all the
wonderful churches, among others the large Marienkirche was destroyed." 123
Like the rape of German women, forcing Germans to watch the destruction of
their homes, as well as their places of worship, was a means for the Russians to gain
psychological revenge for the SS and Wehrmacht having violated the U.S.S.R and its
people during Operation Barbarossa. In the case ofthe Lehmann family, being forced to
witness the destruction of Danzig was a violation, similar to rape in that it left a
significant lasting memory, a permanent scar. More importantly, these traumatic
memories show a sense of German victimization as both former residents of a now
pulverized city and as Christians.
For those Germans in Danzig who did survive siege, fire, and rape, their uncertain
future, with some facing imprisonment, others randomly executed, sometimes seemingly
at random, and still others subject to forced labor, furthered their sense of victimization.
Anna Schwartz was eventually taken from her air-raid shelter by Russian MPs to a farm
where many Germans were fed, housed, and interrogated by an NKVD commissar to
determine their wartime activities. "In a state of terror, we waited for what was to
happen," she wrote. Anna was bounced around the former Gau to various internment
camps. While in one at Langfuhr, several members of her original entourage were
executed. "We assumed the Poles had accused these Germans of something," Schwartz
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explained. 124 This assumption may have been correct, as the next day she was put on a
train headed for a work camp in the South Urals and would not return to West Germany
until1948. Gisela Lehmann, who had been interned with her family in one of the many
camps set up on the outskirts of the city, recalled that she and her family were lucky to
have escaped because it subsequently became known that the prisoners from the camp,
were almost all sent to Siberia. 125 Deportations to hard labor in various parts of the
Soviet Union were not an uncommon experience for many Danzigers. Army Group
Rokossovsky would deport 55,000 from East and West Prussia for forced labor in the
Soviet Union over the next year. 126
According to the statements, testimonies, documents and literature from Danzig,
Germans could only perceive, empathize with, and mourn the traumas inflicted on them
by the Red Army. Yet, in some instances, their latent sense of duty and belief in Nazi
ideology and order caused German Danzigers to participate in SS reprisals and scorched
earth policies. The worst manifestation of German suffering, which appears to be rape,
seems to have been exacerbated by notions of Nazi racism against Russian soldiers with
Asian features. German victimization by the trauma which rained down upon Danzig in
March of 1945 also manifested itself in a desire by Danzigers to find ways to separate
themselves from Nazi collaboration, often through a relapse into religious fervor in which
victimhood was defined by both civic pride and religious devotion. However, this
dynamic as described above was not untainted by Danzigers' acceptance of Nazi
ideology. Ultimately, the complete destruction of the city of Danzig left those Germans
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who witnessed and survived the siege with no identity other than that of traumatized
SUrviVOrS.

In post-war German memory, the brutality Germans experienced at the hands of
Soviet soldiers during the Red Army's march to Berlin, particularly in the emerging Cold
War era, propagated ideas in West Germany that the country's new citizens were not the
perpetrators of World War II, but its victims. Not until the 1960s did a new German
understanding ofthe Soviet motivations for their soldiers' brutality against Germans
emerge. Introduced by Gunter Grass in Die Blechtrommel (The Tin Drum), these ideas,
which Grass contextualized in terms of wartime experience of Danzigers certainly
recognized Soviet troops' ferocity. Particularly in the chapters titled "Ant Traif' and
"Should I or Shouldn't F' he simultaneously suggested that while the suffering they

inflicted on Danzig's Germans was terrible, it was the result of German support for and
complicity with the Nazis.
In "Ant Traif', Grass acknowledges the suffering that Germans experienced at

Soviet hands by recreating the culture oftrauma that existed in the final month of the war
and by recreating the traumas that Soviet soldiers inflicted on Germans in the cellars and
bomb shelters of Danzig during the last days of March 1945. "Ant Trail" as a title
reflects German suffering as a result of the Russian invasion, with its connotations of
long lines of refugees moving like ants along a cold and tumultuous trail, fleeing the Red
Army in their migrations west during the winter and spring of 1945. Although Grass was
not a direct witness to Danzig's trauma in March 1945, since he was wounded at Cottbus
while serving in the Weln:nacht, he nonetheless also portrays the trauma many city
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residents experienced through imagery of refugees, soldiers, and tanks fleeing the
fighting and of soldiers and Volkssturm men hung by the SS for cowardice and by
depicting the fear and trauma of Danzig's cellar culture. Grass furthers his depiction of
German victimization at Soviet soldiers' hands by portraying the experiences of a
fictional group of Germans, the Matzerath family, in one ofDanzig's basements. After
the Russians enter the Matzerath basement, three of them immediately began to rape
Lena Greff, a native Danziger and friend of the Matzerath family. The protagonist, Oskar
Matzerath, watches as, "more and more calmly Ia Greff lay spread out beneath one after
another of the three Ivans. When one of them decided to call it a day, my gifted drummer
handed Oskar on to a sweating young fellow ... "
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Lena's rape by the soldiers was

certainly a common memory for German women in the east during the final months of
the war, and thus Grass' inclusion of the rape emphasizes Soviet brutality in the most
gruesome and realistic ways.
However, Grass departs from stereotypical notions of Soviet brutality during the
war and rejects popular portrayals of Soviet perpetrators as atheistic uncultured
barbarians from the "Mongol" east, preferring instead to indicate that the soldiers from
different Russian nationalities participated in the rape of German women, regardless of
their racial physical features. Oskar describes the Russians who enter the Matzerath
basement as "perfectly normal Russians, slight racial mixture ... six or seven of them
appeared on the stairs with big eyes and Tommy guns." 128 Oskar's textbook familiarity
with the ethnic breakdown of the Red Army may be an allusion by Grass to illustrate the
result of Nazi propaganda efforts in Danzig prior to the invasion. More importantly,
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Grass points out that the Red Anny soldiers who participated in rape were not only
Asian.
Grass also illustrates the randomness of the rape of German women in that not all
of the Matzerath basement's female captives were victimized. The Russians do not rape
Maria Matzerath, who is much younger, and presumably would have been a preferable
victim over the old and sickly Lena, because she is cradling her son Kurt. Oskar states, "I
had read in Rasputin that the Russian are great lovers of children. This, as I was soon to
learn was perfectly true. Maria trembled needlessly. She failed to understand why the
four Ivans who were not busy with la Greff left Kurt sitting on her lap instead of taking
turns at it themselves . .. " 129 When we consider this tum of events in Grass's story, with a
similar description of witnessed trauma from the Lehmann family, it may very well be
that Russians showed some sympathy to mothers. Lena's rape, as well as that of
Siegfried and Gisela's grandmother, demonstrates that age, physical appearance and
condition seemed to be relatively unimportant to the rank-and-file Red Anny soldier in
choosing victims of sexual violence.
This depiction of the Matzerath family's suffering at the hands of Soviet
victimizers enables Grass to suggest that much of the responsibility for Soviet barbarity
fell on Germans who were unable and unwilling to part with their Nazi past.
Symbolically Grass makes this connection through his depiction of the family's patriarch,
Alfred Matzerath. A Reichsdeutsche originally from the Rhineland, Alfred is an agent of
Nazism who refuses to believe that the Nazi era has come to an end. As the city burned,
he watched from the cellar in disbelief," .. .as a child who can't make up his mind
whether to go on believing in Santa Claus ... " Denial quickly dissolves into fear, when
129
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Alfred realizes he still is in possession of a Nazi party pin, which, if discovered by the
Russians, would mean certain execution, because as Oskar points out, "You didn't joke
with the Russians." 130 Determined to erase any form of visual or material proof of his
wartime politics, Alfred tries to pass the pin to the basement's female inhabitants, but
Lena and Maria, both of whom are native Danzigers, distance themselves from the past
once possessed by Alfred by refusing to take Alfred's pin. Oskar narrates that Alfred
then decides to smash the pin into the ground, since neither Lena Greff nor Maria
Matzerath would take the pin from him. 131 Lena and Maria, both ofwhom are native
Danzigers, distance themselves from the past once possessed by Alfred by refusing to
take Alfred's pin. Oskar, though, refuses to allow Alfred to obfuscate the past by
destroying the pin. He rescues the pin from oblivion, and when a Soviet soldier finishes
with Lena, tidies himself, and picks up the diminutive Oskar, thinking him to be a young
child, Oskar hands Alfred back his pin. Alfred grabs the pin from Oskar, and desperately
tries to hide his Nazi association by swallowing the pin, an act which only makes those
past associations obvious to the Soviet soldiers:
Little by little, fear took possession ofMatzerath as he felt the emblem of his
party between his fingers ... But he wanted desperately to get rid of it, and despite
the rich imagination he had shown as a cook and window dresser, he could think
of no other hiding place than his mouth ... That little move was enough to startle
the two lvans ... They thrust there Tommy guns at Matzerath's belly and it was
plain for all to see that Matzerath was trying to swallow something. 132
Oskar, by reclaiming the party pin and giving it back to Alfred, refused to allow his
presumptive father to escape responsibility for his Nazi past. One of the Russian soldiers,
frustrated with the situation, shoots Alfred using an entire magazine of bullets.
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Ultimately, Grass attributes the ferocity and excess of the soldier to Alfred's refusal to
admit his responsibility for the war. Oskar, by reclaiming the party pin and giving it back
to Alfred, causes the death ofhis presumptive father. Symbolically, it is a statement of
blame and punishment of crimes, which focuses on the memories of German
victimization.
Grass continues to place responsibility for the war squarely on the Germans'
shoulders in next chapter, "Should I or Shouldn't I," a chapter in whichthe Poles begin to
take over the city. Maria, now an embittered and traumatized war widow, is employed by
Fajngold, a survivor ofTreblinka concentration camp. Maria, consumed by German
suffering during the war, shows Fajngold the most visible manifestation of that suffering,
the corpse of Alfred, still in the cellar. By showing Alfred's body to Fajngold, a survivor
of tragedy himself, Maria is equating the crimes committed against Germans during the
war with the Holocaust. In this case, Grass presents Maria's actions as an allegory for the
large numbers of people in post-war West Germany who felt that the two tragedies were
comparable to one another. Maria keeps the body around long after Alfred's death,
displaying it so that she too may possess victimhood, embodied in Alfred's corpse. But
Grass also points out the absurdity of such conclusions in depicting Maria, while happy
to work briefly for Fajngold, as only having sympathy for German suffering as opposed
to Jewish suffering, evident in her failure to understand Fajngold's insanity and in her
blunt rejection of his offer of marriage. She instead opts to be transferred with Oskar and
Kurt to West Germany, where her notions of German victimization would be accepted
and embraced.
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How well Germans have absorbed Grass' claims about German culpability for the
end of the war in German cities in the east and for the subsequent victimization by Soviet
soldiers is less certain. For instance, Oliver Hirschbiegel's 2004 film Der Untergang
(Downfall), loosely based on the diary ofHitler's personal secretary, Traudt Junge
suggested once more that Germans had been victimized by Soviet totalitarianism in the
war's aftermath. The film, which highlights the last days of a number of high ranking
Nazis, left to defend Berlin from the advancing Russian Army, depicts the widespread
panic associated with the collapse of the Nazi state, with panic over the Soviet advance
and loyalty to the old regime often leading to suicides of Nazi officials in Berlin. The
film also depicts SS reprisals against pedestrian Berliners as well as a general trend of unnecessary German deaths in the defense ofthe city. Although, Hirschbiegel's film
focuses on the German defense ofBerlin, its last frames recount the fates of Berlin's Nazi
defenders, with disproportionate emphasis on the leaders who came into Soviet captivity,
such as General Wilhelm Mohnke and General Helmuth Weidling, both charged with
Berlin's defense, or Otto Giinsche, Hitler's personal adjunct, all ofwhom spent many
years in Soviet captivity.
While the strengths of this film are its historical accuracy and a realistic depiction
of a pre-traumatic terror syndrome caused by shelling, suicide and SS reprisals in Berlin
in the late April of 1945, Der Untergang adroitly avoids the topic of the Holocaust.
Furthermore, German perpetration of wrongdoing on anyone other than Germans in the
film is non-existent with no mention whatsoever to any specific or general Nazi crimes in
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, against either Jews, Slavs, or any other victims of
the war. The very word "Jewish" is only spoken twice in the dialogue and only at the end
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of the film, does Hirschbiegel include a text frame which reads by the time of the official
surrender on 7 May, 1945, " ... the war had cost over 50 million lives. 6 million Jews had
been murdered in concentration camps." 133
While this film has nothing to do with the fall of Danzig, which occurred a month
before the fall of Berlin and Hitler's suicide, it raises the issue of the memory associated
with the Russian siege of German cities in the east. According to the statements,
testimonies and documents from Danzig, Germans could only perceive, empathize with,
and mourn the traumas inflicted on them by the Red Army. Yet, in some instances, their
latent sense of duty and belief in Nazi ideology and order caused German Danzigers to
participate in SS reprisals and scorched earth policies. In many ways, this film is an
extension of this failure to establish a balanced discussion of German victimization and
perpetration. Surely, at least some of those Nazi officials in and around the Berlin
Fuhrerbunker, or lay residents who lived in the vicinity of the Reich Chancellery had

some levels of knowledge ofNazi crimes. However, the final scene of the movie shows
an aged Traudl Junge, the former personal secretary of Hitler, express her innocence in
not knowing about anything to do with the Holocaust until after the war. Is Hirschbiegel
trying to convey the idea that a pre-traumatic terror syndrome was the cause of so many
Germans being unable to see beyond their own victimization at the hands of the Soviets?
Junge's post-war realization and ultimate acceptance of her participation in the Nazi
regime, as the very last frame of the film is analogous to the film's overall approach to
the topic of the Holocaust as almost an afterthought. Hirschbiegel's interest in many high
ranking Nazis' Soviet imprisonment conveys the idea that for people in a city like Berlin
or Danzig, a self-realization of German perpetration of the war could only occur in a
133
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post-war Europe, where the emerging communist authorities and governments would be
most active and vociferous in carrying out de-nazification.
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The Reclaiming of Gdansk

By 30 March 1945 Danzig was nothing more than a memory, both physically and
politically. That day General Berling's 151 Polish Army, which had helped the Soviets
win the city, hoisted the red.,.and-white flag of Poland on the remains of city hall and
announced the creation of the Polish provisional government for Gdansk. The
provisional government faced enormous challenges including how to rebuild a destroyed
city and how to negotiate with Russian military officials to speed up wartime recovery.
These challenges in tum were complicated by the city's diplomatic insecurity. As the
rise of the Cold War left the city's new Polish occupiers without multilateral international
security guarantees, Polish communist officials also struggled with how to recast the
city's German past, for the needs of the Polish present. What would that mean in terms
of immediate post-war trauma? How would Polish efforts to integrate Gdansk into
Poland impact perceptions of the city's past? How would these efforts subsequently be
remembered by those Gem1ans and Poles who experienced them?
What emerged from the rubble ofDanzig in the year 1945 was the new city of
Gdansk. A place where Polish authority executed their claims to the region through a
multi-faceted process ofpolonization. In the process, the often traumatic initiatives to
effect this change mirrored those of the nazification programs of Danzig during the war
and pre-war years. On the one hand, German memory of this period focused on
sufferings inflicted against the German population which had survived the capitulation to
the Red Army. On the other hand, Polish memory of the immediate post-war period
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justified the suffering inflicted upon Germans and their collaborators in terms of fulfilling
the greater goals of reshaping Danzig into Gdansk.
The Poles faced the overwhelming task of rebuilding the city, as Danzig had been
almost completely destroyed. Elizabeth Clarke used the term "systematic" to describe
the extent to which the city was reduced to rubble by the Red Army. Some of the few
buildings which the Russians had spared included the East Prussian Fire and Life
Assurance, the Danzig Police Headquarters, and the Danzig Prison so that the NKVD
could examine records of ownership, criminal, and political archives, as well as police
files from during the war. Ninety percent of all buildings, eighty-five percent of
industrial plants, and thirty-five percent of roads were destroyed. Clarke quotes a recent
Gdansk tour guide book which stated that overall, ninety percent of the old city had been
destroyed and that two to three million cubic meters of rubble lay where Danzig had once
stood. 134 These statistics, although rather impersonal and seemingly impossible to
quantify, do indicate the enormity of the job the Poles had in rebuilding Gdansk.
Gdansk's now Polish city administration also inherited a city with a population
ravaged by evacuation and war. The problem for the Polish government was that Gdansk
had suffered a severe population loss as a result of the Soviet invasion. Nearly a quarter
of the city's population, including many Poles had fled the Red Army's advance and
attack on Danzig. Another quarter of the city residents had been killed in the fighting.
Entire neighborhoods lay empty and the reduced population was highly problematic for
both rebuilding and reclaiming Gdansk. 135
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In addition to these challenges related to post-war reconstruction, Polish
authorities faced another set of unique challenges in their accession of the city. The Poles
shared authority with the Red Army and as a result their desire to rebuild and repopulate
the city often appeared at odds with the Soviet authorities' demands to exploit what little
remained in the city for Soviet ends. Soviet and Polish officials for example, clashed
over the pace of Poles returning to their homes that had escaped war damage, with Soviet
officials, according to the commander of the Polish civil militia in a report dated 30 April
1945, refusing to allow Poles to reclaim their former homes: "The Polish population,
which came back to these residences, from which they had been evacuated by the
Germans and even those, who wanted to return to their houses and dwellings, were not
allowed to enter by the Soviet Authority." 136
The tensions were exacerbated by the fact that all measures of the occupation
were ultimately determined by the Soviets until later that spring; and they tended to place
Moscow's demands for material reparations above the Polish reconstruction effort. 137 To
the Spoils of War Commission in Moscow, theft of goods was supposed to contribute to
the rebuilding of the Soviet Union, which took precedence over the rebuilding of Poland.
The Soviet military rank-and-file further desecrated the city even beyond the trauma of
rape, as they were most known for their predisposition towards theft and robbery.
Numerous accounts describe their specific interest in goods such watches, bikes, and
machinery. For the rank-and-file, anything that wasn't locked down or guarded was fair
game. 138
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The Poles owed much gratitude to the Soviets for liberating them from Hitler and
simply had to tolerate such behavior through the spring and early summer. The Polish
communists also undoubtedly recognized that their legitimacy was painfully thin
throughout Poland and particularly thin in Gdansk. Polish communists had not enjoyed
popular support in either the interwar period or during World War II under German
occupation. Krystyna Kersten contends that as Russian occupation authority gave way to
the Polish communist authority, Stalin's prerogatives were to allow the Poles to form a
communist state with goals designed specifically to rebuild and reshape the future of
Poland without simply mirroring Soviet communism. 139 On the other hand, Norman
Davies contends that Soviet political decision making was very active in forming the
future of the Polish communist state. The assumption of Polish territories in the east,
including cities such as Vilnius and Lw6w as part of the shifting of Poland's borders
westward, forced massive migrations to destroyed and largely abandoned cities such as
Gdansk. Davies contends that these population shifts provided the primary impetus for
reconstructing a city like Gdansk that had been a predominantly German cultural space
for centuries. 140
On another level, Poland's new communist authorities also encountered
extraterritorial challenges to their administration of Gdansk. Emerging tensions between
the Soviet Union and its Anglo-American allies appeared to place in jeopardy the
extension of Polish authority into the recovered territories, of which Gdansk was a part.
These formally German territories, stretched from the pre-1939 Polish-German border
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westward to the Oder-Neisse River and south to the San River. They were incorporated
into the new Polish state seemingly at the behest of allied concessions. Their
incorporation into the post-war Polish state had been discussed at the Tehran conference
in November and December of 1943 as a means of compensating Poles and for territory
the Soviet Union had seized in the east in the first weeks of the war but subsequently had
refused to relinquish. 141 The Soviet authority's heavy political hand, particularly their
refusal to accept the Polish London government-in-exile as the legitimate government for
Poland and to militarily assist the insurrection launched in August 1944 by the exiled
government's insurgents in Warsaw and the subsequent communist political putsch in
Romania that same month, had left Britain's Winston Churchill, hesitant to officially
endorse the western territories' inclusion into the Polish state. 142 At Yalta, in January and
February 1945, the Western Allies had suspended an official decision on this matter until
a final peace conference. Thus, although the future Polish communist government had
signed an agreement with the Soviet Union which outlined the territorial boundaries of
the Polish state and included these so-called western territories in November 1943. The
refusal of the western Allies to do the same and the absence of a post-war peace
conference to provide mutual security guarantees for Poland's new western boundary
meant that Polish sovereignty there was far from secure. Thus, for the Polish communist
authorities the threat of western retaliation or of some form of German revanchism
remained. 143
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The Poles responded to their rebuilding challenges and in particular their insecure
hold over the western territories by embracing a stringent polonization campaign,
reminiscent of the germanization previously promoted there during World War II. One
of the first directives by the Warsaw government was to order Polish railroad workers
from the former city of Bromberg, now called Bydgoszcz, to the city to repair and clear
tracks between Gdansk and Gdynia on 3 April, 1945. They simultaneously changed and
repaired signs, which were now written in Polish. 144 As already mentioned, the Polish
communists had encouraged millions of Poles displaced by war and Soviet assumption of
eastern territories to move west. Recent research by Sylwia Bykowska claims however,
that by and large the Polish government did not encourage people to immigrate to a place
like Gdansk, preferring the displaced persons to settle in less appealing areas ofthe
western territories. The Polish communists intentionally downplayed Gdansk as a
destination for refugees as they predicted it would be a popular destination without
having to excessively encourage Poles from the east to resettle in the city. 145
However, Bykowska claims that the immigrants who did come to Gdansk came for
economic opportunities, which the rebuilding of a port city would surely provide. She
claims that many of these displaced Poles coming to Gdansk, arrived with these false
notions of its history, politics, and ethnic demographics. Their ignorance left these
people with the impression that the city had a long and proud Polish history and identity.
The refugees saw the city as home of the defenders of the Westerplatte Garrison and the
Polish Post Office and were thus quite shocked to find the presence of Germans and a
German past among the rubble. Their surprise manifested itself in animosity towards the
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Germans who had survived the battle and remained in the city. 146 These displaced Poles
were eager to embrace a policy of strict polonization which the communists would
subsequently enforce. The question for the Polish communists then, was how to create a
propaganda campaign that would support claiming as Polish a traditionally German space
such as Gdansk.
The Polish communists moreover, were not above realigning history to meet
larger national needs. Through propaganda efforts, they claimed that the newly acquired
areas of modem-day western Poland had been historically Polish in the Middle Ages and
thus, their incorporation into the post-war Polish state was an act of recovering what
originally had been Polish. Even in places like Western Pomerania and Silesia, territories
which had been a part of the Polish state ofMieszko I (960-992), this argument defied
political realities, because Polish sovereignty had been relatively brief and had collapsed
by 1181 in western Pomerania and 1368 in Silesia. But, communist efforts to include
Gdansk as a part ofthe "recovered territories" manipulated the territorial reach of the
medieval Polish state because Gdansk had not become Polish until1454, long after the
medieval Polish state that the communists claimed to have "recovered" had collapsed. 147
Communist attempts to include Gdansk into the historic medieval Polish state also
worked to suppress the city's German-dominated history. In places in East and West
Prussia, which had a stronger Polish presence this was easier and more justifiable. 148
But, Danzig did not have a huge Polish presence in the modem period and had not
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possessed significant Polish population since the medieval Polish state. 149 Most
historians agree that Poles had not made up any more than about five percent of the
region's population prior to the war. Finally, including Gdansk in the recovered
territories denied the city's historical opposition and its economic competition with the
Polish Republic in the interwar period. 150 Part of this historical re-interpretation of
history presented to the Polish public in propaganda campaigns as a consequence of the
post-war need to embrace national unity. These manufactured notions of history to
support a communist future was largely accepted by Poles from east and central Poland
who had been displaced by the ravages of war and were forced to migrate. Thus
widespread acceptance of a policy of reclaiming territories which would entail that
Poland's traditional borders shift westward to support these migrations.
Even as the Poles embraced historical ideas that did not always apply to Gdansk,
the questionable international security of the western territories undoubtedly made them
hesitant to completely erase the city's heritage through its most visually evident form:
architecture. Part of the challenge in the rebuilding process of Gdansk for Polish
architects and engineers was to rewrite the memory of the city. For communist
authorities in 1945, tying Gdansk back into the Polish sphere through rebuilding efforts
would justify annexation of the city without official international approval or historical
validity. Their task was to build Gdansk as a place that always had a strong Polish
element, while being palatable and politically correct for a communist future, and at the
same time making decisions that did not openly provoke western ire. A Polish tourism
booklet of the city, produced in 1962 shows photographs of specific destroyed places in
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Gdansk in April of 1945, juxtaposed with photos of the same places in 1962, completely
rebuilt. No doubt written under the auspices of communist authors and censors the
pamphlet includes a brief history of the city intended to try to justify rebuilding and
reclaiming efforts by linking the city to a historically Polish past. The author offers as
evidence, statements such as, "The very earliest relics-archaeological finds dating from
the Tenth through Twelfth centuries, a testimony to the city's Slavonic past. .. " or" ...just
as in centuries gone by, Gdansk owes its development today to the fact that it serves the
Polish maritime economy ... " 151 By including photos of rubble from 1945, with photos of
an aesthetically pleasing and bustling communist society in 1962, the authors of the
booklet wish to show more than how successful the rebuilding projects had been. The
entire booklet is meant to demonstrate in a Machiavellian sense, under the guise of
tourism, that the ends- successful modern Gdansk- stands testament to the validity of the
means- the Polish reclaiming initiative.
Evidence of Polish discomfort over the presence of Germans in Gdansk can be
seen in the ways they deprived them of food and then held them responsible for diseases
plaguing the city and attributed to the Germans. Many reports indicated that in former
areas of East and West Prussia, disease often caused by m alnutrition was prevalent
among the region's Germans as a national group. Because of their status as a defeated
people, they had almost no access to food. One report stated that Germans in Gdansk
were preparing food with weeds and using fertilizer for salt. Gisela Lehmann
corroborated these claims when she stated that "nothing was left for the remaining
German people in any way." She and her family had to beg for scraps, as anything of

15 1

Jerzy Stankiewicz and Bohdan Szermer, Gdansk, (Warsaw: Arkady Edition, 1962), 4-5.

84

substance they had was usually stolen. 152 Under these conditions typhoid fever was
common, especially in the jails and interment camps which mostly housed Germans.
Polish authorities however, blamed the Germans for being harbingers and propagators of
disease and even went so far as to suggest that their removal from Gdansk would end a
typhoid epidemic there. The director of the Gdansk Health Board suggested for example:
"With the resettlement, even if not of the whole, but at least the largest part ofthe
German population from Gdansk, the epidemic could be completely subdued." 153
Another major challenge facing the Polish authorities was the place of Germans in
a city whose future was to be Polish. The Poles immediately began to utilize the
remaining Germans as a labor resource. Most of the Germans who had not fled from the
Red Army and had survived the fall and destruction of the city, as well as the subsequent
expulsions that spring and summer were designated for labor efforts in rebuilding the city
and its infrastructure. Those who remained were categorized as "able-bodied" or "nonable bodied." A later directive produced by the Polish Social Security Commission at
the Conference on Questions of the Evacuation and Co-Ordination of the New
Settlement, on 22 September 1945 stated that any non-able bodied Germans, including
those who rejected working for the state, were to be expelled. 154 German labor was doing
much of the actual bricklaying for the purposes of rebuilding Gdansk and reclaiming the
city into a Polish sphere of which it had belonged to earlier in the millennium, with labor
representative of its more recent German character as Danzig.
Polish authorities, citing German responsibility for disease, ultimately expelled
Germans from the city and from the country. Expulsions began in earnest from Gdansk
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to points westward well before the Potsdam conference in July and August of 1945
officially sanctioned expulsions. As early as 1 June, signs ordering Germans to leave
were posted throughout the city. 155 The Polish authorities were inconsistent in the
notification of Germans designated for expulsion. In some instances prior to Potsdam,
departure cards were mailed to Germans, ordering them to a specific train station for
departure to the west. However, the Polish militia, particularly prior to the summer of
1945, were famous for forcibly and arbitrarily extracting Germans from entire rows of
houses, giving them minutes to choose some belongings, before herding them to the
trains. In many cases, expulsion was fairly voluntary and Germans co-operated fully
with the militias, knowing that they had no future as Germans in Gdansk. 156 It is unclear
how many Germans fled, emigrated, or were transferred out of Danzig prior to Potsdam,
as sufficient records of this were not kept. 157 The scope of the expulsions made it appear
as if they were wholesale rather than selective in nature. Expulsion at the hands of the
Polish authorities also did not seem limited to non-able bodied and sick Germans, but
rather were random and targeted Germans indiscriminately.
After the 2 August, 1945 Potsdam Agreement stipulated legal and humane
expulsion as a means of resolving ethnic strife in the region, almost the entire remaining
German population of 100,000 in Gdansk, not imprisoned was marked for expulsion.
However, most witnesses indicate that there was certainly nothing humane about
expulsions after Potsdam. Polish authorities in Gdansk transported Germans in much the
same way Germans had transported Jews and Poles to concentration camps or other
points in the east. Gerhard Nitschke witnessed Polish militias systematically evacuating
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Germans street by street in Soppot in September. He reported that Germans were ordered
to pack and were then taken to the train station in the evening, so that their expulsion
would be done in secret. "There it became clear this was a raid concerned with the
cleansing of the city," Nitschke remarked. He also noted that over 8,000 people were
expelled from Soppot in August alone, including sixty sick and injured individuals from
the German hospital there. 158 The Lehmann family also was expelled in August. Gisela
recorded that they were taken to the train station with similar abruptness, and placed on a:
" ...Transport of injured people back to the now occupied Reich. A filthy cattle car which
contained a large number of amputees and very sick people was now to be our home for
two weeks. During this time several people died." 159
International media coverage of the trauma inflicted by these so called "humane"
expulsions suggests a further similarity between post-war polonization efforts and
wartime nazification efforts. German trauma during the expulsions revealed a dynamic
of retribution against Germans and other expelled enemies of the state similar to German
repression ofPoles and Jews during World War II. Norman Clark, who reported on 24
August from Berlin for the British newspaper News Chronicle, testified that the
polonization of Gdansk was just as brutal as the nazification of Danzig had been during
the war. The Berlin correspondent of the Times suggested in early September that Polish
authorities had executed male heads of households before initiating deportation
procedures, a move similar, of course to Nazi efforts to eliminate those who posed the
greatest threat to Nazification: "A women recovering from typhoid had, she stated, seen
her husband beaten to death by Poles and she had then.been driven from her farm near
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Danzig to work in fields." 16 Clarke also noted that Polish authorities slowed transports,
with some taking over a week to cross the Oder, with little food, water, or provisions and
enduring constant harassment by Poles and the Red Army. This post-Potsdam trauma
suffered by the expellees from Gdansk spared neither adults nor children, healthy or
otherwise. The Times for example reported an expose about the arrival in Berlin of three
orphans from Gdansk, who were parentless and deported alone. The article read,
"These three German children are paying for the sins their fathers may have
committed. They are 'displaced' orphans, turned out ofPolish orphanage in
Danzig and sent back to Germany in tightly packed cattle trucks, without medical
care and almost without food. The Poles, many of whose children looked like
these not long ago, are clearing all hospitals of German patients, no matter how
sick.l61

This dynamic of retribution to the very last against the Germans was manifested
in other forms of trauma and repression against the expelled. Clarke noted that trains
coming in from Danzig, full of expellees, also carried Polish bandits who stripped the
expellees of valuables: "Poles, who sat apart, waiting for the next train to go out. Then
they would board it, and going through the train, would force these unprotected mothers
and women to give up any possessions of value, including watches and jewels. 162
Continued violence, repression, and robbery remained a problem for those who, after
already enduring so much, were forcibly transferred to the west.
As expulsion dropped in volume by late autumn 1945, the Warsaw government's
new prerogative for cities like Gdansk was to identify and investigate Poles suspected of
collaborating with the Nazis as well as to decide if the remaining Germans had any future
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or usefulness in the city. As the year 1945 came to an end, the Poles placed the
rebuilding efforts and the need to retain skilled individuals, regardless of ethnicity, ahead
oftrying to de-germanize and de-nazify Poland. By 1946 however, few Germans
remained in Gdansk, with estimates suggesting that by this year only 6,000 Germans
remained in the city, while 284,000 had been expelled since March of 1945. 163 Regional
Verification Committees, also established in 1945, were to complete this final stage of
polonization. The drop in the German population of the region suggests that their efforts
were largely targeted at those Poles who had claimed ethnic German status during the
war and at mixed ethnicities, such as Kashubians, Koznavians, and Masurians, who also
had been privileged racially over Poles by the Germans.
The Committees soon found great difficulty in proving guilt based on the
wartime Volksliste, since so many Poles had applied out of fear of imprisonment or
expulsion and therefore, the lists could hardly be considered accurate. 164 Subsequently,
these committees used a number of tests to determine the "polishness" of those being
investigated. 165 Most of these tests by the Verification Committees were subjective and
highly inconclusive. The Verification Committees, for example, investigated individuals
by their last names and ethnic self identification. The accuracy of this method was
questionable for the Polish authorities because of Gdansk's inherently mixed ethnic
character. 166 At the same time, altering one's name and ethnically identifying oneselfin
such a way that would fit into the racially homogenous goals of the new Polish state
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helped prevent expulsion for those Germans who wished to stay. Hans von Lehndorffs
states in his memoirs that while he was working in a hospital forty miles south-east of
Gdansk after the fighting had stopped, many Germans in this region had begun to refer to
themselves as "Masuren" in order to deny their true German extraction. This statement
suggests, the Verification Committees throughout the former areas of East and West
Prussia investigated Poles, Kashubians, Musurians and other smaller Slavic groups with
the same vigor as Germans to determine possible wartime collaboration with the Nazis.
167
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of the populations allowed for a certain amount of randomness and subjectivity in
deciding who was fit to stay in Gdansk and who was not.
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The bottom line for the Polish authorities in deciding who could be ethnically
polonized was labor requirements, which stipulated that a certain amount of labor
including Germans, was needed in the rebuilding process. At the Congress of
Autochthones in November 1946 the chairman of the Ministry for the Recovered
Territories, Wladylsaw Gomulka, stated; "We shall not give up one single Pole to the
Germans, and we do not want among us Poles one single German." 169 Gomulka and the
Polish communists didn't want Germans, but had a broad definition now of who
constituted a Pole. In other words, Kashubians, too, could be Poles, but Germans
generally couldn't. This statement shows that by the end of 1945, a policy of population
retention superseded expulsion, especially when one considers that by this time a million
people had been determined to be Polish under Gomulka's tenure. The needs oflabor
and reconstruction had to taken precedent over establishing an ethnically pure and
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collaborator free province of Gdansk. Verification Committees served to both polonize
the city as well as contributing to the higher prerogative of the Polish government to
reclaim the city of Gdansk under sometimes dubious pretenses.

The traumatic experience ofthe shifting populations, borders, and possession of
the city of Gdansk left an imprint on how subsequent generations of both Germans and
Poles remember the polonization of the city. The trauma of Danzig's Germans and this
post-war memory is best captured in the canonical fiction of Gunter Grass. His work, as
already discussed in previous chapters, shows both sorrow and acceptance of the post war
settlement. Grassian memory of subsequent generations has accepted that polinization of
the city was terrible, but necessary for the future stability of the region. Polish literature,
after the fall of communism in Poland in 1989, became more liberalized and subsequently
it became permissible to publish more complex accounts of memory of these complicated
events following the capitulation of the city in 1945. A memory of traumatic events,
shared by both Germans and Poles, revolving around one main issue: the validity of
Polish claims to modem Gdansk.
Stephan Chwin in his book, Hanemann, translated into English in 1995 as Death
in Danzig, focused his story on the repopulation and reclaiming of the new of city of
Gdansk. This fictitious account provides a virtual biography of the trials and tribulations
faced by Germans who were allowed or forced to remain in the city as well as examining
the motivations, apprehensions, and guilt of those Poles who relocated to Gdansk from
other parts of war tom Poland. What seems most interesting about Death in Danzig in
the context of examining the complex situation of population shifts and the claiming of
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space is Chwin's belief that it was ultimately correct for the Poles to take the rubble of
Danzig and create the new city of Gdansk. While Chwin is apologetic for the trauma
afflicted on Germans in the city, he defends his opinion that the reclaiming of Gdansk
was ultimately justifiable.
The protagonist ofChwin's novel is a un-named young Polish boy who relocates
with his parents from Warsaw to Gdansk after the fighting. As he and his parents search
for a suitable house to claim and move into, they realize the "omnipresence of a German
past," manifested mainly in the changing of the names of places, signs still written in
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German, and objects left behind by those who had fled. 17 Chwin's characters also
embody a sense of guilt for inheriting spaces of atrocities. This guilt for the events which
transpired at the end of the war in the city is embodied by the haunting remnants of
Gdansk's former residents. This Polish family happens to move downstairs into an
apartment where Hanemann still resides upstairs, in the former district of Langfuhr, now
renamed Wrzeszcz. As the protagonist narrates, " ... as soon as Mama stepped into the
hallway ... she jumped back right away without really knowing why ... Over the letterbox
marked 'Briefe' was a copper plate, with names written in shiny slanting letters: 'Erich
Schultz,' 'Wolfgang Bierenstein,' 'Johann Peltz." 171 The mother's fright may have been
an allegory for guilt over the destruction of German Danzig and the evacuation of many
of its residents.
At the same time, the material culture left by the Germans of Danzig is
metaphorical for the traumas and injustices suffered by Poles in centuries past. Among
the foremost remnants of German culture, discovered by Poles claiming new homes are
Joanna K Stimmel, "Reading the Urban Time/Space: Danzig/Gdansk as a Transnational Memoryscape
in Grass' Unkenrufe and Chwin's Hanemann." (2005 GSA Meeting), 3.
171 Stefan Chwin, Death in Danzig, trans. by Philip Boehm, (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Inc., 1995), 72.
170
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the objects left behind. The objects of German Danzigers are a constant reminder of the
traumatic past ofthe city. Yet, these objects' age and filth also serve to emphasize the
ways in which the Germans who had owned them had subordinated Polish national
desires. As the mother investigates her new home, the narrator writes,
"She opened the doors to the mahogany chest, rattling the leaded glass
planes. Among the cobalt glasses and ceramic jars labeled 'Pfeffer,'
'Salz,' and 'Zucker,' she saw a gleaming white oval tureen with a handpainted Chinese seascape-blue brushwork and brown-sailed junk-and a
lid shaped like a pagoda. When she lifted the lid she left a fingerprint
next to the Rosenthal emblem-a dark pattern on a film of dust, like a
round postmark on an ivory colored envelope." 172

These objects denote the sense of smug comfort embodied by nineteenth century German
petty bourgeois material culture. As the mother investigates these objects representative
of German cultural, social, and politically superiority, she notices their dustiness and
uncleanliness. Chwin tries to capture the German repression of the Poles, during the time
in which many of these artifacts were made, through the symbolism of a gilded, yet filthy
material culture. These nice middle class objects are seemingly gilded by the filth of
German crimes against Poles throughout history. 173
No matter how much Death in Danzig focuses on the memories of Germans' past
associations with the city, it also demonstrates Chwin's opinion that Polish reclamation
of the city was justifiable. German culture in Danzig, Chwin reminds his readers had
degraded Poles in the past and provided a justification for the post-war Polish settlement.
Nor does Chwin question the moral and ethical dilemmas raised by the fact that Poles
simply moved into houses abandoned by Germans. The Polish family in this novel had
escaped the destruction of Warsaw to take part in the rebuilding and reclaiming of
172
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Gdansk in much the same way many Germans had fled from the destruction of the
eastern territories and would eventually participate in the rebuilding of East and West
Germany in the late 1940s and 1950s. 174 So many Poles were homeless in the interior of
Poland and had suffered through the trauma and violence of war. Chwin moreover
justifies the seizure ofhis protagonists' German property, when Hanemann is rescued by
J6zek, the father of the protagonist, from being the victim of szabrownictwo (a Polish
tem1 meaning "looting" which was popular slang after the war in the east). Chwin may
even be demonstrating his opinion on the issue of this form oflatent guilt, by couching
Hanemann's defense at the hands of J6zek as being justification for his claim on the
abandoned apartment. 175
Stefan Chwin's characters no doubt feel a sense of guilt for the events that had
transpired in the city; they ultimately assume and do not really question the role of new
residents in the reclaimed territory. The reader has no way of knowing whether the
protagonist and his family in Death in Danzig, are even aware of the historical
exaggerations behind the idea of reclaiming Danzig, to become Gdansk. However, the
visual evidence of a German past embodied in material culture is blatantly obvious to this
family. Chwin's memory of these events show both guilt for the actions of the post-war
Polish government, as well as acceptance of their long term results, based on the need for
Polish life to re-emerge in Gdansk and Poland at large.

As this chapter has attempted to show, suffering in the new city of Gdansk
continued well beyond the capitulation of Danzig in March 1945. Polish authorities
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immediately realized that they were under the authority of another occupation force.
Nonetheless, their goal was to reshape the future of Gdansk and make it part of an
emerging communist society. The appearance, population, and history of the city would
all have to change. For those Germans who had survived capitulation, a period of
disease, verification, and forced labor would eventually result in the traumatic event of
expulsion or forced polonization. For the Poles, who felt after enduring so much, they
had the right to reclaim Gdansk, even if it meant continued suffering for Germans.
Regardless of the political outcome of the city's re-alignment with Poland, the memories
of this period are still shared and the debate continues on how future generations ofboth
Germans and Poles remember the transformation of Danzig to Gdansk.
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Conclusion

The reclaiming of Gdansk for Poland created immediate trauma but also cast a
long shadow over the memories of successive generations of Germans and Poles who had
been victimized by the war's end. One question which remains germane to this day
within the memories ofboth German and Poles who survived the trauma of Danzig's
destruction and Gdansk's re-construction was the overall justification of the post-war
decision to allow the city to be reclaimed by Poland. The final question, in the interviews
with Siegfried Lehman and Lajica Lewandowska, asked for their overall opinion of the
post-war settlement in Gdansk. Both responses were fairly typical considering the
ethnicities and biographies ofthese two. Lehmann believed that the status ofFree City
should have been re-instated. When asked if he would move from Australia, where he
has lived for over three decades, and return to his home if it were to revert to a Free City,
Lehmann replied "No, I would not return as there would be too many bad
memories ... memories which should never be forgotten." 176 To this question,
Lewandowska demonstrated her peculiar understanding of American history by
comparing the post-war situation to the American civil war, in terms of the stability the
creation of a Polish city of Gdansk would have on the future of the region. When asked
what she thought of the idea to renew the Free State, Lewandowska emphatically replied
"No, no, no! It has to be the way it happened. That's the way it happened ... war is war, it
.
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For Siegfried Lehmann, the violence he witnessed was so prominent a memory of
his young life, that to live there again was inconceivable. Although he briefly lived in
Cologne, Siegfried Lehmann moved away from the northern hemisphere completely,
perhaps due to these memories. Lewandowska seems to have repressed her own
traumatic memory of the war and its aftermath in Gdansk, in positing the creation of a
Polish city as something that was completely justifiable in the post-war world. While
many members of her family have subsequently moved to the United States to escape
communism and the memories ofthis traumascape, she herself has found peace with her
memories and remains in Gdansk to this day.
In the German case the city of Gdansk seems to stand almost as an object lesson
of the history of the war, a constant reminder of the foolishness and dire consequences of
drinking out ofHitler's poisoned chalice. At the same time, the suffering of Germans
from Danzig and many other cities and regions across the east, allowed subsequent
generations of Germans in the west to focus on collective suffering, instead of collective
guilt. Danzig had been considered a bastion of German economic and cultural
achievement in the east and its loss to Poland was mourned by Germans. For Germans
who suffered in Danzig/Gdansk, the memories from this period conjure up images of
death, execution, forced labor, displacement, evacuation, and inhumane expulsion at the
hands ofthe Soviets and the Poles. The space of memory that is Danzig/ Gdansk is not
exceptional is this respect, as many other cities and regions are associated with memories
of German suffering in the immediate post-war east. However, for those like the Lehman
family that survived, all that remains of their identity as Danzigers are traumatic
memories of war.
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In the Polish case, Gdansk stands as the spoils of war earned in the name of
generations of suffering under German domination in Danzig. The city was pulled into
the emerging post-war Polish state with the help of propaganda, internal displacement,
deliberate withholding of medical attention in the face of disease and starvation, which
ultimately led to the evacuation of populations, and finally the Potsdam accords. For
Polish memory, the acquisition of Gdansk was justified for a long-standing history of
repression, culminating in the Nazi takeover of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Poland
and its people had suffered the brunt ofthe atrocities of World War II, perhaps more than
any other European nation, next to the USSR. Memory of Polish suffering dictated that
by whatever means, the communist authority "reclaim" Gdansk.
Even today, a divide exists between Germany and Poland on how to best
remember the sufferings not only of Danzig/ Gdansk but also of the German expulsions
at the end of World War II. As German expellees insist on the commemoration of their
suffering through the creation of a museum dedicated to exploring the expulsions, the
Polish government has proved less than willing to acknowledge Polish responsibility for
the expulsions. In August of 2005 the Polish government outright rejected the possibility
of an Expellee center in Warsaw. President Alexander Kwasniewski believes that such a
place would only serve to lessen the role of Germany's perpetration ofWorld War II,
stating that "our attitude on the center is negative." Supporters of the Expellee center,
such as conservative German Chancellor Angela Merkel, are optimistic that it will be
.
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However, an expellee center in Berlin would not be as significant in terms of its
location and the possession of memory. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s West
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Germany had many such museums and exhibits which sought to bring recognition to the
plight of German expellees and those trapped in the communist east. The fear of the
Polish government is that such a sight would attempt to work through the memory of
German suffering in Warsaw, where Germans perpetrated horrendous crimes, is not
invalid. An expellee center would ask that the Poles recognize their own role as
perpetrators of suffering, something they have been traditionally reticent to do. If an
expellee center were to be built in Poland, would not a city like Gdansk be a more
suitable place? Erika Steinbach, the head of Germany's Union of the Expelled claims to
hail from a town that was once near Danzig. More importantly, this city with its shared
heritage presents itself as a place where the memories of sufferings associated with
World War II are more closely shared between Germans and Poles than either Warsaw or
Berlin.
The purpose ofthis analysis has been to try and create a portrayal of the
"Traumascape" ofDanzig/ Gdansk in the year 1945. I have tried to define a traumascape
as all the various facets of colliding, interwoven, and shared destruction, violence, fear,
and retribution which contributed to both German and Polish memory of suffering in this
particular region. Like a landscape, which focuses on one piece of the world and
attempts to express its salient characteristics, a traumascape attempts to recreate a certain
place's darkest and most horrific qualities. Why use Danzig/ Gdansk as an example one
might ask? Why not Konigsberg/Kalingrad, or Breslau/ Wroclaw, or any other place that
would certainly fall into the category of a traumascape during the end ofWorld War II?
These examples, as well as the entire area that became Poland and East Germany,
certainly have a claim to be studied as a traumascape. However, as stated in the
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introduction, there does not seem to be any significant work exclusively on the shared
traumatic general military history and memory of Danzig in the modem era either in
English, German, or Polish. Such a study certainly has not been written in the context of
a collection of memoirs, documents, interviews, and personal statements of people who
suffered through this time period, be they German or Polish, perpetrator or victim or any
combination thereof.
While examining the documents, testimonies, interviews, fictitious portrayals, and
memoirs pertaining to the suffering of the people living in Danzig/ Gdansk, several larger
issues were raised. Whether it was the period of germanization or nazification of Danzig,
as well as polonization of Gdansk, the history ofthe city ofDanzig/Gdansk also raises the
greater questions ofhermeneutical problems of World War II history. Finding a balance
between suffering inflicted and received is the cardinal problem of German history for
traumatic history specialist Dominick LaCapra, who argues that no matter how well one
works through such multifaceted history, historical investigations such as this analysis
invariably leave one oppressed group historically wronged. 179 For LaCapra there may
simply be no way to not tip the traumatic scales in favor of either German or Polish
memory. With respect to traumatic memory, this city has represented different things to
different people throughout history. Germans and Poles can all point to different periods
of the city of Danzig when they were the war's victims. With the destruction of Danzig in
1945, the city of Gdansk emerged as a place that sought to rectify all wrongs of the past,
by re-populating and rebuilding in order to erase and move on from the past.

179 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
2001), 32-34, 44-45. .
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It is my belief that in order to clearly work through the history, analyze, and

hypothesize upon the shared suffering in this place of memory, historians must consider
the tragedies of all the former and current residents of this place to be as Joanna Stimmel
wrote, "contemporaneous catastrophes that must be discussed in reference to and
reverence of each other." 180 Only then can one proceed to the epistemological claim that
considers Danzig and Gdansk as completely separate entities. Based on political events,
military and diplomatic strategy, as well as social movements in the year 1945, the exact
moment when the city ceased to be Danzig and became Gdansk is certainly debatable.
Unquestionably, the year 1945 was the culmination ofthe city's troubled history,
manifested in the death, rape, evacuation, imprisonment, political repression and
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of people. It is my contention that the complex
traumatic history of 1945 and the many terrible memories and experiences during that
year are precisely what separates the existence of these two cities: Danzig and Gdansk.
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